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Abstract
An agent has access to multiple information sources, each of which provides in-
formation about a different attribute of an unknown state. Information is acquired
continuously—where the agent chooses both which sources to sample from, and also
how to allocate attention across them—until an endogenously chosen time, at which
point a decision is taken. We provide an exact characterization of the optimal in-
formation acquisition strategy for settings where the attributes are not too strongly
correlated. We then apply this characterization to derive new results regarding: (1)
endogenous information acquisition for binary choice, and (2) strategic information
provision by competing news sources.
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1 Introduction
We study dynamic acquisition of information when a decision-maker has access to multiple
kinds of information, and limited resources with which to acquire that information. Our
decision-maker seeks to learn a Gaussian state, and we model each information source as a
diffusion process whose drift is an unknown “attribute” of the state. Attributes are poten-
tially correlated. This structure captures information acquisition in many economic settings,
including for example:
• An investor wants to learn the value of an asset portfolio, and can acquire information
about the value of each asset included in the portfolio.
• A mayor wants to learn the number of cases in his city of a disease outbreak, and
allocates a limited number of tests across individuals from different neighborhoods.
• An analyst wants to forecast a macroeconomic variable such as GDP growth, and needs
to aggregate recent economic activities across industries and locations.
At every instant of time, the decision-maker allocates a fixed budget of resources across the
information sources, which determines the amount/precision of information extracted from
the source. This information is used for a future decision taken at an endogenously chosen
stopping time.
Our model resembles, but does not fall under, the classic multi-armed bandit (MAB)
framework (Gittins, 1979; Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki, 2008). To see this, recall that in MAB,
the choice of which arm to pull plays the dual role of influencing the evolution of beliefs
and also determining flow payoffs. In our setting, information acquisition choices influence
the evolution of beliefs, whereas actions—taken separately—determine payoffs. Thus in our
paper, information acquisition decisions are driven by learning concerns exclusively, and the
exploration-exploitation trade-off central to bandit models does not appear.1
The static version of our problem, in which the decision-maker acquires information at one
instant only and takes an action immediately thereafter, is straightforward. Because normal
signals can be completely Blackwell-ordered based on their precisions (Hansen and Torgersen,
1This feature also distinguishes our results relative to a classic literature on “learning by experimentation”
(Easley and Kiefer, 1988; Aghion et al., 1991; Keller et al., 2005).
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1974), different resource allocations (i.e., different mixtures over the sources) can be com-
pared based on how much they reduce the variance of the payoff-relevant state. Moreover,
because these are Blackwell comparisons, the optimal resource allocation does not depend
on the decision problem that the decision-maker faces. Our problem is also straightforward
if information is acquired over a known interval of time, as the decision-maker should acquire
information (in any order) to minimize uncertainty about the payoff-relevant state at the
known end date.
But if the decision time is not known ex-ante, then the decision-maker may have to
trade off between learning more about the state in a given period of time versus acquiring
information that will result in better decisions later on. This trade-off arises because a
given source not only provides information about the state; it also potentially alters the
information value of the other sources. To solve the dynamic problem, the decision-maker
has to take into account how acquisitions today change the value of information tomorrow;
these dynamic externalities can be quite complex to describe.
Our contribution is to demonstrate that the optimal dynamic acquisition strategy can
nevertheless be explicitly characterized, so long as the unknown attributes are not too
strongly correlated. Under this strategy, the decision-maker initially exclusively acquires
information from the single most informative source, where “more informative” is evalu-
ated with respect to his prior belief over the unknown attribute values. At fixed times, the
decision-maker begins learning from additional sources, and divides resources over these new
sources as well as the ones he was learning from previously. Eventually, the decision-maker
acquires information from all sources using a final and constant mixture. Similar to the
solution for the static problem, the optimal information acquisition strategy holds for all
decision problems.
The main idea in the proof is the following: Intertemporal trade-offs exist when the
optimal acquisitions for some decision time are “in conflict” with those for a later decision
time, forcing the decision-maker to choose between what is best for the two possible decision
times. If however the optimal resource allocations across different times are achievable under
a single sampling strategy, a property that we call “uniform optimality,” then such trade-
offs do not appear. We show that so long as the different attributes are not too strongly
correlated, a uniformly optimal strategy exists and has the nested structure that we described
above. See Section 4.3 for a more detailed proof sketch.
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Beyond the specific statements of the results, a main contribution of this paper is demon-
strating that in the present framework (i) the study of endogenous information acquisition is
quite tractable, permitting explicit and complete characterizations; and (ii) there is enough
richness in the setting to accommodate various economically interesting questions (e.g., about
comparative statics in primitives such as correlation across attributes). This makes the char-
acterizations useful for deriving new substantive results in settings motivated by particular
economic questions. We illustrate this with two applications:
The first setting that we consider is endogenous information acquisition for binary choice.
A large literature in economics and neuroscience (originating with Ratcliff and McKoon
(2008)) models a consumer’s decision process for choosing between two goods with unknown
payoffs. Although this literature has primarily focused on optimal stopping times given
exogenous information, a model in Fudenberg et al. (2018) endogenizes the information ac-
quisition process. This model is nested in our framework as the case of two unknown payoffs,
where the decision-maker wants to learn the difference of these payoffs (as the difference is
a sufficient statistic for which payoff is larger).
Fudenberg et al. (2018) show that if payoffs are Gaussian, independent and symmetric,
then the decision-maker optimally mixes equally over the sources at every moment in time.
Our analysis generalizes this result to correlated payoffs, asymmetric initial uncertainty, and
asymmetric levels of source informativeness. We can thus use our characterization to derive
new comparative statics with respect to these primitives. We find that an increase in initial
uncertainty about either payoff results in more resources devoted to learning about that
payoff at every instant, while an increase in signal noise has an ambiguous effect (which
we describe). We also consider a comparative static in the correlation between the payoffs,
and find that an increase in the size of correlation asymmetrically favors the source that the
decision-maker attends to first. All of these are new and empirically testable predictions.
In our next application, we consider a game between strategic information sources with
imperfectly correlated information, who compete over readers’ attention by choosing the
precision of the information they provide. Our setting is intermediate between monopo-
lists—who provide unique information and hence can fully extract rents by revealing this
information slowly—and perfect competition—where firms are identical and compete away
rents by providing precise information. Our analysis reveals that information providers with
imperfectly correlated information compete for readers in the short-run and exploit readers in
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the long-run. Thus, a crucial force determining the equilibrium quality of information is how
information providers trade off between the short- and long-run. We find that information
is of higher quality when information providers are less forward-looking, when the informa-
tion they provide is more positively correlated, and when prior uncertainty is lower, as each
of these increases the relative importance of the short-run competition. These results rely
crucially on our main characterization of information acquisition, which allows us to derive
the time path of readers’ attention allocations given the sources’ choices of precision.
1.1 Related Literature
We build on a large literature about optimal dynamic information acquisition. In contrast
to an earlier focus in the literature on the choice of signal precisions (Moscarini and Smith,
2001), our framework contributes to a recent literature regarding choice between different
kinds of information. For example, Che and Mierendorff (2019) and Mayskaya (2019) con-
sider dynamic choice from Poisson signals that confirm either of two states. Our model
considers a large number of sources that each provide information about a different un-
known. In this respect, our model is closest to Fudenberg et al. (2018), Gossner et al. (2019),
and Azevedo et al. (2020). In Fudenberg et al. (2018), the agent can learn about the (in-
dependent) values of two goods by observing the evolution of diffusion processes, and in
Gossner et al. (2019), the agent can learn about the values of K goods (again, independent)
by observing Bernoulli signals.2 Azevedo et al. (2020) study static allocation of resources
(i.e., test users) across learning about the quality of multiple independent and fat-tailed
innovations. Compared to these papers, we emphasize learning about correlated unknowns.
In the context of learning about multiple attributes, Klabjan et al. (2014) and Sanjurjo
(2017) study a search problem where each attribute value is perfectly learned upon a single
inspection. Working with general distributions, these authors show that an attribute is
“more attractive for discovery” than another whenever its distribution is a mean-preserving
spread of the latter. Besides having noisy Gaussian signals, the main distinction of our
informational setting is again that we allow for correlation across attributes and focus on
2Gossner et al. (2019) study the consequences of attention manipulations, where the agent is forced to
attend initially to one particular attribute. This interesting question bears certain high-level resemblances
to our comparative statics in Section 5. However, we focus on consequences for the time path of attention,
instead of consequences for the final decision (which good is chosen), as Gossner et al. (2019) do.
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what this correlation implies for the optimal strategy.
There is not a large prior literature on dynamic learning in the presence of correlation.
One interesting model is that of Callander (2011), where the available signals are the real-
izations of a single Brownian motion path at different points, and the agent (or a sequence
of agents) chooses myopically. This informational setting has since been extended in sev-
eral productive ways: Garfagnini and Strulovici (2016) consider the optimal experimentation
strategy for a forward-looking agent with acquisition costs, while Bardhi (2019) studies gen-
eral Gaussian sample paths and introduces potential conflict between an agent acquiring
the information and a principal making the decision. These models differ from ours in that
agents can perfectly observe any of an infinite number of attributes, and the correlation
structure across the attributes is derived from a primitive notion of similarity or distance.
Several papers consider agents who choose from completely flexible information struc-
tures at entropic (or more generally, “posterior-separable”) costs, such as in Yang (2015),
Steiner et al. (2017), He´bert and Woodford (2019), Morris and Strack (2019), and Zhong
(2019).3 Compared to these papers, our agent has access to a prescribed (physical) set of
signals, and acquires information under an attention capacity constraint. Thus the different
signals in our setting are equally costly to acquire regardless of the current belief, which is the
key distinction from measuring information acquisition costs by the reduction of uncertainty.
In previous work (Liang et al., 2017), we analyzed a related setting in discrete time,
introduced the notion of “myopic information acquisition” and studied its approximate op-
timality properties.4 We did not obtain a characterization of the optimal strategy itself.
Going beyond those results, the characterizations in the present paper precisely (and more
generally) describe the optimal path of attention allocations, which are useful in applications
as we illustrate.
Finally, our analysis in Section 6 contributes to a literature about how competition across
news sources affects the quality of news (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2008). Several papers study
endogenous choice of media slant (Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005; Gentzkow and Shapiro,
2006; Chan and Suen, 2008; Perego and Yuksel, 2018), and recent models have additionally
3It is interesting that Steiner et al. (2017) also show how the solution to their dynamic problem reduces
to a series of static optimizations, similar to our multi-stage characterization. However, their argument is
based on the additive property of entropy and differs from ours.
4Liang and Mu (2020) consider a more general environment in which the number of sources may exceed
the number of unknowns, and study when myopic acquisitions lead to asymptotically (in)efficient learning.
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endogenized news informativeness (Galperti and Trevino, 2020; Chen and Suen, 2020). Our
analysis focuses on this latter aspect of news quality. Different from the prior work, we
consider the effect of information precision on the time path of people’s information demand,
and how these dynamic considerations affect the informativeness of news.
2 Model
An agent has access to K information sources, each of which is a diffusion process that
provides information about an unknown attribute θi ∈ R. The random vector (θ1, . . . , θK) is
jointly normal with a known prior mean vector µ and prior covariance matrix Σ. We assume
Σ has full rank, so the attributes are linearly independent.
As we describe in more detail below, the agent’s decision depends on a payoff-relevant
state ω ∈ R. We assume the state is an affine function of the attributes:
Assumption 1. ω =
∑K
i=1 αiθi + b for known weights α1, . . . , αK ∈ R and constant b ∈ R.
It is equivalent to assume that ω is jointly normally distributed together with the θi, and that
there is no residual uncertainty about ω given complete knowledge of the attribute values.5
Because any attribute value can be replaced with its negative, assuming αi ≥ 0 is without
loss. For ease of exposition, we will further assume that each weight αi is strictly positive.
Intuitively, an attribute with zero payoff weight does not matter for learning about ω; in
Appendix C.5 we verify this is true under our assumptions. The weights α1, . . . , αK along
with the prior covariance matrix Σ are the relevant primitives of our model.
Time is continuous, and the agent has a budget of attention to allocate at every instant
of time. Formally, at each t ∈ [0,∞), the agent chooses an attention vector β1(t), . . . , βK(t)
subject to the constraints βi(t) ≥ 0 (attentions are positive) and
∑
i βi(t) ≤ 1 (allocations
respect the budget constraint).
Attention choices influence the diffusion processes X1, . . . , XK observed by the agent, in
the following way:
dX ti = βi(t) · θi · dt+
√
βi(t) · dBti . (1)
5If ω, θ1, . . . , θK are jointly normal, then the conditional distribution of ω | θ1, ..., θK is itself a normal
distribution whose mean is a linear combination of θ1, . . . , θK and the prior mean of ω. The assumption of
no residual uncertainty means that the conditional variance is zero, returning Assumption 1.
6
Above, each Bi is an independent Brownian motion, and the term
√
βi(t) is a standard
normalizing factor to ensure constant informativeness per unit of attention devoted to each
source.6 In particular, devoting T units of time to observation of source i is equivalent
to observation of the normal signal θi + N (0, 1/T ) or T independent observations of the
standard normal signal θi +N (0, 1).7
Remark 1. As these comments suggest, there is a natural discrete-time analogue to our
continuous-time model: at each period t ∈ Z+, the agent has a unit budget of precision to
allocate across K normal signals. Choice of attention vector (π1(t), . . . , πK(t)) results in one
observation of the normal signal θi+N (0, 1/πi(t)) for each source i = 1, . . . , K. See Section
7 for further discussion.
Let (Ω,P, {Ft}t∈R+) describe the relevant probability space, where the information Ft that
the agent observes up to time t is the collection of paths
{
X≤ti
}K
i=1
(with X≤ti representing the
sample path ofXi from time 0 to time t). An information acquisition strategy S is a map from{
X≤ti
}K
i=1
into ∆({1, . . . , K}), representing how the agent divides attention at each instant
as a function of the observed diffusion processes.8 In addition to allocating his attention,
the agent chooses how long to acquire information for; that is, at each instant he determines
(based on the history of observations) whether to continue sampling information, or to stop
acquiring information and take an action. Formally, the agent chooses a stopping time τ ,
which is a map from Ω into [0,+∞] satisfying the measurability requirement {τ ≤ t} ∈ Ft
for all t.
At the endogenously chosen end time τ , the agent will choose from a set of actions A
and receive the payoff u(τ, a, ω), where u is a known payoff function that depends on the
stopping time τ , the action taken a and the payoff-relevant state ω. This formulation allows
for additively separable waiting costs, u(τ, a, ω) = u1(a, ω)− c(τ), as well as geometric dis-
6Having constant informativeness across sources implies that it is with loss to further normalize the payoff
weights αi to be equal. Indeed, our subsequent results indicate that the case of equal weights is special. For
example, with K = 2, the conclusions of Theorem 1 always hold when α1 = α2 but not in general.
7Note that this definition also treats “attention” and “time” in the same way, in the sense that devoting
1/2 attention to source i for a unit of time provides the same amount of information about θi as devoting
full attention to source i for a 1/2 unit of time.
8We assume that given the agent’s attention strategy, the stochastic differential equations in (1) have a
solution. This is true for example if each βi(t) is a deterministic function of t (as in the optimal strategy
that we describe in Theorems 1 and 2), or if
√
βi(t) satisfies standard Lipschitz conditions (see Section 6.1
of Yong and Zhou (1999)).
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counting, u(τ, a, ω) = δτ ·u2(a, ω). The agent’s posterior belief about ω at time τ determines
the action that maximizes his expected flow payoff E[u(τ, a, ω)]. We will only impose the
following weak assumption on the payoff function:
Assumption 2. Given any (normal) belief about ω, maxa E[u(τ, a, ω)] is decreasing in τ .
That is, we assume that holding fixed the agent’s beliefs at the time of decision, an earlier
decision is better. In the case of u(τ, a, ω) = u1(a, ω) − c(τ), this means the waiting cost
c(τ) is increasing in τ ; in the case of u(τ, a, ω) = δτ · u2(a, ω), this assumption requires the
optimal flow payoff maxa E[u2(a, ω)] to be non-negative (for example if there is a default
action that always yields zero payoff).
To summarize, the agent chooses his information acquisition strategy and stopping time
(S, τ) to maximize
max
S,τ
E
[
max
a
E[u(τ, a, ω)|Fτ ]
]
,
Our focus throughout this paper is on the optimal information acquisition strategy S. In
general the strategies S and τ should be determined jointly, but our results will show that
in many cases the optimal S can be characterized independently from the choice of τ .
3 Preliminary Analysis
At every time t, the agent’s past attention allocations integrate to a cumulated attention
vector
q(t) = (q1(t) . . . , qK(t))
′ ∈ RK+
describing how much attention has been paid to each source thus far. A useful property
of Bayesian updating from Gaussian signals is that the agent’s posterior covariance matrix
about (θ1, . . . , θK) can be expressed as a function solely of q(t), and in particular does not
depend on the realizations of the diffusion processes. This posterior covariance matrix is
(Σ−1 + diag(q(t)))−1 (2)
where Σ is the prior covariance matrix over the attribute values, and diag(q(t)) is the diagonal
matrix with entries q1(t), . . . , qK(t). The above formula says that the posterior precision
matrix (i.e., inverse of the posterior covariance matrix) is the sum of the prior precision
matrix (Σ−1 in this case) and the signal precision matrix (diag(q(t)) in this case).
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Due to the Gaussian structure of the problem, maximizing the informativeness of the
learning process about ω up to time t is equivalent to minimizing the posterior variance of
this payoff-relevant state. Using (2) and the decomposition of ω from Assumption 1, the
agent’s posterior variance of ω is
V (q) = α′(Σ−1 + diag(q))−1α. (3)
This function V is globally convex, differentiable, and decreasing in each qi. See Appendix
A.1 for the proof of these properties and others.
In the special case in which the agent stops at a fixed and known time T , every information
acquisition strategy that minimizes the posterior variance of ω at time T is optimal (see
Section 4.3 for details), and the order of acquisitions does not matter. The sequence of
acquisitions does matter outside of this special setting, and we characterize these below.
4 Optimal Information Acquisition Strategy
In Section 4.1 we consider the case of two attributes, as the simpler setting allows us to
derive stronger results and explain certain key intuitions. In Section 4.2 we present results
for any finite number of attributes, and in Section 4.3 we describe our proof strategy.
4.1 Two Attributes
Suppose there are two attributes θ1 and θ2, and two information sources about them. The
agent seeks to learn ω = α1θ1+α2θ2, with each αi > 0. His prior over the unknown attributes
is (θ1, θ2) ∼ N (µ,Σ). The covariances between the attributes and the payoff-relevant state
are covi := Cov(ω, θi) = αiΣii + αjΣji, and we assume that these covariances satisfy the
following relationship:
Assumption 3. cov1 + cov2 = α1(Σ11 + Σ12) + α2(Σ21 + Σ22) ≥ 0.
Since both variances Σ11,Σ22 are positive, Assumption 3 essentially requires the covariance
Σ12 to be not too negative relative to the size of either variance.
9 It is sufficient for the
weights on the two attributes to be equal (i.e., α1 = α2), in which case Assumption 3 holds
9We note that the set of beliefs satisfying Assumption 3 is absorbing: once a belief satisfies Assumption
3, all subsequent posterior beliefs (following any strategy, not necessarily optimal) will as well.
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for all priors.10 Another sufficient condition is for the attributes to be positively correlated
(Σ12 = Σ21 ≥ 0), in which case Assumption 3 holds for all weights α1 and α2.
Our first result establishes the optimal information acquisition strategy under this as-
sumption.
Theorem 1. Suppose K = 2 and Assumption 3 is satisfied. Define
t∗i :=
covi − covj
αj det(Σ)
.
W.l.o.g. let covi ≥ covj. Then an optimal information acquisition strategy is history-
independent and hence can be expressed as a deterministic path of attention allocations
(β1(t), β2(t))t≥0. This path consists of two stages:
• Stage 1: At all times t ≤ t∗i , the agent optimally allocates all attention to attribute i
(that is, βi(t) = 1 and βj(t) = 0).
• Stage 2: At all times t > t∗i , the agent optimally allocates attention in the constant
proportion (β1(t), β2(t)) =
(
α1
α1+α2
, α2
α1+α2
)
.
Thus there are two stages of information acquisition. In the first stage, which ends at
some time t∗, the agent allocates all of his attention to one of the attributes. After time t∗,
he divides his attention across the attributes in a constant ratio. The long-run instantaneous
attention allocation is proportional to the weights α. Note that depending on the agent’s
stopping rule, Stage 2 of information acquisition may never be reached along some histories
of realized diffusion processes. But as long as the agent continues acquiring information, his
attention allocations are as given above.11
The characterization reveals that the optimal information acquisition strategy is com-
pletely determined from the prior covariance matrix Σ and the weight vector α. In particular,
it does not depend on the agent’s payoff function u(τ, a, ω), including his time preferences.
When the prior belief satisfies Assumption 3, the optimal information acquisition strategy
is constant across different objectives and also across different stopping rules. Relatedly,
we can solve for the optimal stopping rule in this setting as if information acquisition were
10This follows from 2 · |Σ12| ≤ 2 ·
√
Σ11 · Σ22 ≤ Σ11 +Σ22.
11Under mild assumptions on the primitives, the optimal attention strategy is unique up to the stopping
time τ (after which attention allocations obviously do not matter). See Online Appendix O.1 for details.
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exogenously given by Theorem 1.12 In Online Appendix O.3, we provide an example to
illustrate that these properties can fail when Assumption 3 is violated. Online Appendix
O.4 further shows that for the case of two attributes, Assumption 3 is not only sufficient but
also necessary for our characterization to hold independently of the agent’s payoff criterion.
Below we illustrate this optimal strategy using a few simple examples.
Example 1 (Independent Attributes). Suppose (θ1, θ2) ∼ N (µ, ( 6 00 1 )), and the agent wants to
learn θ1 + θ2. Then, applying Theorem 1, the agent begins by putting all attention towards
learning θ1. At time t
∗
1 =
5
6
, his posterior covariance matrix is the identity matrix. After
this time he optimally splits attention equally between the two attributes, which are now
symmetrically distributed.
Example 2 (Correlated Attributes). Now suppose the attributes are correlated; for example,
(θ1, θ2) ∼ N (µ, ( 6 22 1 )), and the agent wants to learn θ1 + θ2. Applying Theorem 1, the agent
begins by putting all attention towards learning θ1. At time t
∗
1 =
5
2
, his posterior covariance
matrix as given by (2) becomes
(
3/8 1/8
1/8 3/8
)
, which makes the two attributes symmetric. After
this time he optimally splits attention equally between the two attributes.
Example 3 (Unequal Payoff Weights). Consider the prior belief given in the previous example,
but suppose now that the agent wants to learn θ1 + 2θ2. As before, the agent begins by
putting all attention towards learning θ1. Stage 1 ends at time t
∗
1 =
3
2
, when the posterior
covariance matrix is
(
3/5 1/5
1/5 2/5
)
. After this time, he optimally acquires information in the
mixture (1/3, 2/3).
To interpret the optimal strategy, first consider the case of equal payoff weights (α1 = α2),
as in Examples 1 and 2. Then, the condition cov1 = α1Σ11 + α2Σ21 ≥ α1Σ12 + α2Σ22 = cov2
reduces to Σ11 ≥ Σ22. So Stage 1 involves a direct comparison of prior uncertainty about
the two attributes, where the agent initially chooses to learn exclusively about the attribute
over which he is more uncertain. More generally, even with unequal payoff weights, we can
measure value of information by how much it reduces the variance of the payoff-relevant
state ω. The condition cov1 ≥ cov2 says that the marginal value of learning about attribute
θ1 exceeds that of learning about θ2, according to the prior belief.
12The optimal stopping rule does in general depend on signal realizations, except for special payoff functions
(e.g., quadratic loss) such that the posterior mean of ω does not affect the flow payoff maxa E[u(τ, a, ω)].
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Suppose without loss of generality that cov1 ≥ cov2, so that the agent initially learns
exclusively about θ1. As information about θ1 accumulates, the marginal values of learning
either attribute evolve, with the marginal value of θ1 decreasing faster than θ2. Eventually,
these marginal values equalize. From this point on, the agent optimally acquires information
in a constant ratio that is proportional to the weight vector α. Dividing attention in this way
achieves the most efficient aggregation of information about ω. Moreover, as we show in the
proof, acquisition of information proportional to α maintains equal marginal values of the
two information sources, so that acquiring information in this mixture remains optimal.13
We provide a more involved proof outline in Section 4.3.
4.2 K Attributes
We now consider the case of multiple attributes, where we will show that the results for the
K = 2 case extend qualitatively. A sufficient condition on the prior belief, parallel to the
one stated in Assumption 3, is the following:
Assumption 4. The inverse of the prior covariance matrix Σ−1 is diagonally-dominant.
That is, [Σ−1]ii ≥
∑
j 6=i |[Σ−1]ij | for all 1 ≤ i ≤ K.
For the case of two attributes, Σ−1 = 1
det(Σ)
· ( Σ22 −Σ12−Σ21 Σ11 ), so this assumption requires the
covariance Σ12 to be smaller in magnitude than both variances Σ11 and Σ22, which would
imply our previous Assumption 3. For general K, a sufficient (although not necessary)
condition for Assumption 4 is that the prior covariance between every pair of attribute
values is small compared to their prior variances (see Appendix A.3 for the proof):
Σii ≥ (2K − 3) · |Σij | ∀i 6= j.14 (4)
13This long-run mixing over sources is reminiscent of one stage in the optimal information acquisition
strategy characterized in Che and Mierendorff (2019) and Mayskaya (2019), where information from any of
the Poisson sources is equally valuable, and the agent optimally mixes between the sources. One difference
is that, in the mentioned papers, this stage is associated with an absorbing belief which is not updated until
news arrives. In contrast, our agent’s beliefs do evolve, but endogenously follow a path where the mixture
remains optimal. Nevertheless, the high-level similarity suggests that the existence of a “mixing stage” may
exist more generally, beyond the information environments that we respectively consider.
14Note that this condition requires the covariances to be not too negative, and also not too positive, which
differs from the previous Assumption 3. Loosely, the difference between the K = 2 and K > 2 cases is that
with K > 2, the relationship between any two sources (i.e., whether they are complements or substitutes) is
12
To interpret this latter condition, note that prior covariances measure the complementarity
or substitution effects across the information provided by different sources (i.e., whether
information from one source increases or decreases the learning benefits from other sources).
Condition (4) and more generally Assumption 4 limit the magnitude of these effects, so that
the agent’s short-run and long-run information acquisition incentives are more aligned.
Theorem 2. Suppose Assumption 4 is satisfied. Then, there exist times
0 = t0 ≤ t1 ≤ · · · ≤ tK−1 < tK = +∞
and nested sets
∅ = B0 ( B1 ( · · · ( BK−1 ( BK = {1, . . . , K},
such that an optimal information acquisition strategy is described by a deterministic path of
attention allocations (β1(t), . . . , βK(t))t≥0. This attention path consists of K stages: for each
1 ≤ k ≤ K, the instantaneous attention allocation is constant at all times t ∈ (tk−1, tk] and
supported on the sources in Bk. In particular, the optimal attention allocation at any time
t > tK−1 is proportional to α.
The times tk as well as the attention allocations (and their support Bk) at each stage
can be determined directly from the primitives α and Σ, and are history-independent. In
Online Appendix O.5, we provide an algorithm for computing these times and sets, and
illustrate this with an example. Theorem 2 thus tells us that the agent can reduce the
dynamic information acquisition problem to a sequence of K static problems, each of which
involves finding the optimal constant ratio of attention for a fixed period of time (from tk−1
to tk). Moreover, as in the K = 2 case, the optimal information acquisition strategy does
not depend on the agent’s payoff function.
We point out that Assumption 4 is sufficient but not in general necessary for these results
to hold, unlike Assumption 3 in the case of two attributes. For example, an alternative
sufficient condition is that the off-diagonal entries of Σ−1 are negative, which roughly requires
the attributes to be positively correlated (see Remark 2 in Appendix C). From our proof of
Theorem 2, one may in fact derive an if-and-only-if condition on α and Σ that guarantees
the multi-stage characterization, although it is less interpretable.
affected by observation of other sources outside of this pair. In particular, two sources that were previously
complementary can cease to be so when the agent optimally samples a third source, and their covariance
can switch sign along the path of information acquisition. This does not happen with K = 2.
13
Finally, we can show that starting from any prior belief, the agent’s posterior beliefs will
eventually satisfy Assumption 4 under optimal sampling. It follows that the characterization
given in Theorem 2 eventually holds. As a corollary, optimal attention allocation is eventually
constant and proportional to the weight vector α.15 See Online Appendix O.6 for details.
4.3 Proof Outline for Theorems 1 and 2
The plan of the proof is to first define a uniformly optimal strategy, which minimizes the
agent’s posterior variance of ω at every possible stopping time. If a uniformly optimal
strategy exists, then it is optimal for all decision problems in the class described in Section
2. We then show that under the assumption on the prior belief that we provide, uniformly
optimal strategies do exist, and have the structure that we characterize.
Definition of a uniformly optimal strategy. For every time t, define the t-optimal
attention vector to be the allocation of t units of attention that minimizes posterior variance
of ω (Lemma 4 shows this minimizer is unique):
n(t) = argmin
q1,...,qK≥0,
∑
i qi=t
V (q1, . . . , qK),
where V was defined in (3). We will say that an attention allocation strategy is uniformly
optimal if it integrates to the t-optimal vector at every t.
Definition 1. Say that an information acquisition strategy S is uniformly optimal, if it is
deterministic (independent of signal realizations) and its induced cumulated attention vector
at each time t is n(t).
This is a strong property, and existence of such a strategy is in general not guaranteed.
When a uniformly optimal strategy exists, it is optimal. By definition, if a cumu-
lated attention vector is t-optimal, it implies that the agent has learned as much about ω as
possible in the interval (0, t]. Thus, if the agent stops acquiring information at time t (and
takes the optimal action), his expected flow payoff is maximized among all strategies that
deterministically stop at t. The form of the payoff function u does not matter because, due
15The notion of “eventual” is uniform across payoff functions and signal histories: our proof shows that
there exists t depending only on α and Σ, such that optimal attention at any time t ≥ t is proportional to α.
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to normal beliefs, achieving minimum posterior variance means that the agent’s information
up to time t is Blackwell more informative than under any other strategy (Blackwell, 1951;
Hansen and Torgersen, 1974).
Requiring that q(t) is t-optimal at every time t then implies that the information ac-
quisition strategy is most informative about ω at every history and maximizes expected
payoffs given any exogenous stopping time. In our Gaussian environment, such a strategy
also maximizes expected payoffs even when the stopping time can be endogenously chosen;
this generalizes a result of Greenshtein (1996) to our continuous-time setting (see Lemma
5 in Appendix A.2). It follows that whenever a uniformly optimal strategy exists, it must
be the optimal strategy in our problem.16 It remains to show that under Assumption 4, a
uniformly optimal strategy does exist, and has the structure described in Theorem 2.
Existence of a uniformly optimal strategy. To show that a uniformly optimal strategy
exists, we make use of the following simple lemma:
Lemma 1. A uniformly optimal strategy exists if and only if the t-optimal attention vector
n(t) weakly increases (in each coordinate) over time.
In words, we require that for every t′ > t, the optimal allocation of t′ units of attention
devotes a higher amount of attention to each source compared to the optimal allocation of t
units. This is necessary and sufficient for a single information acquisition strategy to achieve
the optimal cumulated attention vectors at both times.
Whether or not this condition is satisfied turns out to depend on the cross-partials of
the posterior variance function V . When information from different sources are comple-
ments—meaning that additional information about one attribute improves the value to ad-
ditional information about another—the agent optimally chooses a positive mixture to take
advantage of the complementarity. In contrast, if more information about attribute i de-
creases the marginal value of information about attribute j, then the agent may prefer to
re-allocate attention away from attribute i towards attribute j to avoid the substitution.
This can lead the optimal allocation of t+∆ units to involve less attention towards attribute
16While it is possible to write down the Bellman equation for this control problem, the value function (as
a function of the current belief) is high-dimensional and difficult to solve for explicitly, especially if we do
not have any structure on the payoff function u(τ, a, ω). Our argument based on Blackwell comparisons gets
to the optimal policy (i.e., attention allocation) without going through the value function.
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i than the optimal allocation of t units. The consequence is a failure of monotonicity in
the t-optimal vectors n(t), precluding existence of a uniformly optimal strategy. See Online
Appendix O.3 for such an example.
Assumptions 3 and 4 control the sizes of the cross-partials of V at the prior belief, and
imply that at all subsequent beliefs along the optimal sampling path, different sources are
complements whenever their marginal values are highest. This ensures that the agent will
always acquire signals in positive mixtures, so a uniformly optimal strategy exists.
Structure of the uniformly optimal strategy. When a uniformly optimal strategy
exists, the instantaneous attention allocations β(t) are simply the time-derivatives of the t-
optimal vectors n(t). Under this strategy, the agent divides attention at every moment across
learning those attributes that maximize the instantaneous marginal reduction of posterior
variance V .17
When there is a single attribute that maximizes reduction in V , as is the case for a generic
prior belief, the agent optimally allocates all attention towards learning the corresponding
attribute. As beliefs about that attribute, say attribute i, become more precise, the marginal
value of learning about i decreases continuously relative to the marginal value of learning
other attributes. Eventually the marginal value of learning about i will equal the marginal
value of learning about some other attribute j.
At this point, there are multiple attributes that yield the same marginal value of reduc-
tion in variance. Since V is differentiable, directional derivatives can be written as a convex
combination of the partial derivatives in each of the coordinate directions. Hence, all mix-
tures over i and j lead to the same, maximal, instantaneous reduction in uncertainty about
the state. However, these mixtures have different implications for the marginal values of
the different sources at future instants. For the dynamic problem, the agent thus optimally
17We mention that the idea of trying to maximize the marginal value of learning is known in the operations
research literature as knowledge-gradient ; see for example Frazier et al. (2008, 2009). These papers establish
the asymptotic optimality of knowledge-gradient strategies when the agent seeks to select the best one out
of K unknown payoffs. Although we also study a correlated Gaussian environment, we have a different
decision problem based on a weighted sum of the unknowns (the two settings overlap only when K = 2 as we
discuss in Section 5). Moreover, our Theorems 1 and 2 show that knowledge-gradient is exactly optimal in
many situations. In this sense our results complement those of Frazier et al. (2008, 2009), which give general
bounds on the potential loss of adopting knowledge-gradient.
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turns from the “first-order” comparison of marginal values to a “second-order” comparison
of mixtures. We demonstrate that there is a unique mixture over i and j that maintains
equivalence of their marginal values, and this mixture is selected in the optimal dynamic
strategy. Technically, we derive the (second-order) optimal mixture by working with the
Hessian matrix of V ; see Lemmata 3, 9 and 10 in the appendix.
The rest of the proof follows similarly: as uncertainty about attributes i and j decrease,
eventually their marginal values equal those of a third attribute. At this point the agent ex-
pands his observation set to include the new source(s), and we can repeat the same reasoning.
This yields the “nested-set” property in Theorems 1 and 2.
5 Application 1: Binary Choice
The framework we study relates to a large body of work regarding “binary choice tasks,”
in which an agent has a choice between two goods with payoffs v1 and v2, and can devote
effort towards learning about these payoffs before making his decision. The well-known drift-
diffusion model (Ratcliff and McKoon, 2008) supposes that the agent observes a diffusion
process whose drift depends on which good yields the higher payoff. This corresponds to a
case in which the agent’s prior belief is supported on two points—either (v1, v2) = (vL, vH)
or (v1, v2) = (vH , vL) where vH > vL are known quantities. Thus the agent has uncertainty
over which good is better, but not over how much better it is. Fudenberg et al. (2018)
recently proposed a variation on this model to allow for the latter kind of uncertainty. In
their uncertain drift-diffusion model, the agent has a jointly normal prior over (v1, v2), and
has access to two diffusion processes with drifts corresponding to these unknown payoffs.
Both the classic drift-diffusion model and also Fudenberg et al. (2018) focus primarily on
deriving the optimal stopping rule given exogenous information, which we do not pursue here.
But Section E of Fudenberg et al. (2018) additionally considers a model in which the agent
endogenously acquires information by choosing attention allocations (subject to a budget
constraint) that scale the evolution of the two diffusion processes. Assuming that the agent’s
payoff function u(τ, a, ω) has the additively separable form u1(a, ω)− c(τ), then the payoff
difference v1 − v2 is a sufficient statistic for the agent’s decision.18 This corresponds exactly
18The assumption of additively separable payoff follows Fudenberg et al. (2018), who explain how geomet-
ric discounting would disallow the analysis via the payoff difference (see their Footnote 18).
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to our framework with K = 2, θ1 = v1, θ2 = −v2, and equal payoff weights α1 = α2 = 1.
Fudenberg et al. (2018) show that if the agent’s prior is both independent and symmetric,
i.e. Σ = I, then the agent optimally devotes equal attention to both payoffs at all times.
We now show how our Theorem 1 generalizes this result in two directions: arbitrary priors
(Section 5.1) and asymmetric information precision about the two payoffs (Section 5.2).
5.1 General Prior Covariance Matrix
Suppose the agent’s prior is(
θ1
θ2
)
∼ N
((
µ1
µ2
)
,
(
σ21 ρσ1σ2
ρσ1σ2 σ
2
2
))
.
Here, ρ ∈ (−1, 1) captures the prior correlation between the two unknown payoffs. Recall
that with equal payoff weights α1 = α2 = 1, Theorem 1 characterizes the optimal information
acquisition strategy starting from any prior. We thus obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 1. Suppose σ1 ≥ σ2. The agent’s optimal information acquisition strategy (β1(t), β2(t))
in this binary choice problem consists of two stages:
• Stage 1: At all times
t ≤ t∗1 =
1/σ22 − 1/σ21
1− ρ2 ,
the agent optimally allocates all attention to the first information source (about θ1).
• Stage 2: At times t > t∗1, the agent optimally allocates half of his attention to each
information source.
When Σ = I, the threshold is t∗1 = 0, so that the agent splits his attention evenly from the
beginning. This returns Theorem 5 in Fudenberg et al. (2018). Corollary 1 demonstrates
that two aspects of their characterization generalize: starting from an arbitrary prior co-
variance matrice Σ, the agent will eventually acquire information according to the constant
proportion (1
2
, 1
2
). Moreover, this proportion is optimal from the beginning whenever the
two unknown payoffs have the same initial uncertainty. But if the prior belief is ex-ante
“asymmetric,” the agent initially devotes all attention to learning about the payoff he deems
more uncertain.19
Corollary 1 additionally allows us to derive new comparative statics in the prior belief.
19We note additionally that the Fudenberg et al. (2018) result does not characterize “off-equilibrium”
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Corollary 2. Suppose σ1 ≥ σ2. Then, holding all else equal:
• an increase in σ1 results in uniformly higher attention towards source 1 (i.e., β1(t) is
weakly larger at every t);
• an increase in σ2 results in uniformly lower attention towards source 1;
• an increase in |ρ| results in uniformly higher attention towards source 1.
Since the long-run proportions with which the sources are viewed are independent of Σ
(Stage 2 in Corollary 1), changes in the prior only affect the attention strategy by changing
t∗1, the time at which the agent switches from observing source 1 to observing both sources.
The first two comparative statics are intuitive: since σ1 > σ2, the agent initially has greater
uncertainty about the first payoff. As we increase this difference in prior uncertainty—either
by increasing σ1 or decreasing σ2—Stage 1 increases in length and the threshold t
∗
1 moves
later. To understand the last comparative static, note that as the degree of correlation |ρ|
increases in magnitude, information about the first payoff becomes more revealing about the
second payoff. Thus, everything else equal, it takes longer for the agent’s uncertainty about
the first payoff to “catch up” with his uncertainty about the second payoff. So t∗1 increases.
All of these are new predictions enabled by our previous results, and are testable empirically.
5.2 Asymmetric Levels of Informativeness
We can alternatively enrich the Fudenberg et al. (2018) setting by allowing the two sources
to have different levels of informativeness per unit of attention. This would be the case if,
for example, it was easier to obtain information about one of the payoffs than the other.
Formally, suppose that (θ1, θ2) ∼ N (µ, I) as in Fudenberg et al. (2018), but each diffusion
process Xi evolves as
dX ti = βi(t) · θi · dt+ ζi
√
βi(t) · dBti.
The new parameter ζi > 0 captures the informativeness of the process, and larger ζi corre-
sponds to a more noisy source. Under this setup, a unit of attention paid to source i delivers
a normal signal of the form θi + ǫi, where ǫi ∼ N (0, ζ2i ).
attention allocations (where the agent has paid unequal attention to the two sources in the past). In contrast,
our corollary above applies to all prior beliefs and thus allows for characterization of optimal information
acquisition following any history, including those in which the agent has previously behaved sub-optimally.
19
To map this setting into our main model, we normalize the noise terms to have unit
variances as follows. Define θ˜i = θi/ζi, so that each unit of attention spent on source i
equivalently generates a standard normal signal about θ˜i. Under this transformation, the
payoff-relevant state is ζ1θ˜1 + ζ2θ˜2, and the agent’s prior covariance matrix over (θ˜1, θ˜2) is
Σ˜ =
(
1/ζ21 0
0 1/ζ22
)
.
Assumption 3 is satisfied in this transformed problem, thus the optimal attention choices
(β1(t), β2(t)) are again characterized by Theorem 1.
Corollary 3. Suppose ζ1 ≤ ζ2. The agent’s optimal information acquisition strategy (β1(t), β2(t))
in this binary choice problem consists of two stages:
• Stage 1: At all times t ≤ t∗1 = ζ1(ζ2 − ζ1), the agent optimally allocates all attention
to source 1.
• Stage 2: At times t > t∗1, the agent optimally allocates his attention in the constant
proportion
(
ζ1
ζ1+ζ2
, ζ2
ζ1+ζ2
)
.
When ζ1 = ζ2, so that the sources are equally informative, the threshold is t
∗
1 = 0 and the
mixture at Stage 2 is (1/2, 1/2), again returning Theorem 5 in Fudenberg et al. (2018). But
when the sources have different levels of informativeness, then the agent initially devotes
all attention to learning from the more informative source, which however receives lower
attention in the long run.
This corollary permits study of how changes in ζi, the noisiness of a source, affect the
time path of attention. Recall that we previously considered a similar comparative static
regarding initial uncertainty. Comparison of the two corollaries reveals that prior noise and
signal noise affect attention allocation in different ways. In contrast to the straightforward
comparative static in σ1 reported in Corollary 2, the effect of a local increase in ζ1 has two,
potentially competing, effects: (1) it changes the length of Stage 1 (i.e., t∗1), and (2) it also
affects the long-run proportions with which the two sources are viewed in Stage 2.
The direction of the second effect is clear: increasing the noise level ζ1 always results in
a higher long-run share of viewership for source 1. But the first effect on the length of Stage
1 can be ambiguous: making its information more noisy simultaneously reduces the initial
marginal value of source 1, but also reduces the speed at which this marginal value shrinks
to the marginal value of source 2. The closed-form expression for t∗1 in Corollary 3 implies
that
∂t∗1
∂ζ1
≥ 0 if and only if ζ1 ≤ ζ2/2. Thus, when ζ1 is quite small relative to ζ2, increasing
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the noisiness of source 1 leads to higher attention in both Stage 1 and in Stage 2. As ζ1
increases beyond the threshold ζ2/2, further increasing the noise level leads to lower attention
to source 1 in Stage 1, and higher attention in Stage 2, with a potentially ambiguous overall
effect. We are not aware of prior literature that studies this effect of information precision
on the time path of people’s information demand.
Finally, it is straightforward to consider a model incorporating both the generalizations
of Section 5.1 and 5.2; we defer this analysis to Appendix D.1.
6 Application 2: Competing News Sources
Next, we apply our results to study information provision in a setting with strategic infor-
mation providers. Specifically, we are interested in how competition affects the quality of
information, when sources strategically determine the precision of the information that they
provide.
To fix ideas, suppose a politician has been associated with two potential cases of miscon-
duct in office: negligence in handling sensitive military information and use of public office
to advance personal goals. The severity of each of these acts is unknown, and the public
expects them to be correlated: e.g., politicians who are careless with sensitive materials
are more likely to abuse power, and vice versa. Two online news sources respectively have
connections with military personnel and with staff in the White House, and report on the
corresponding misconduct case. These sources primarily earn revenue by running ads, so
they aim to maximize time spent on their site. The choice variable is the informativeness of
articles on their site.
Formally, a representative news reader seeks to learn the sum of attributes θ1 and θ2
(Online Appendix O.12 generalizes the analysis to K attributes and K competing sources),
and his prior over these parameters is(
θ1
θ2
)
∼ N
((
µ1
µ2
)
,
(
σ21 ρσ1σ2
ρσ1σ2 σ
2
2
))
,
where ρ ∈ (−1, 1) measures prior correlation between θ1 and θ2.20 We assume that the prior
covariance is not too negative compared with the prior variances:
20All of our results extend to a mass of readers sharing this common prior.
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Assumption 5. σ1 + ρσ2 ≥ 0 and σ2 + ρσ1 ≥ 0.
This is guaranteed if the prior is symmetric (σ1 = σ2) or positively correlated (ρ ≥ 0).
Each of two news sources i = 1, 2 (freely) chooses a standard deviation ζi, where a unit of
time spent on its site is equivalent to a realization of θi + ǫi, with ǫi ∼ N (0, ζ2i ).21 Although
there is no cost for the news sources to provide more informative articles, in equilibrium the
sources will choose strictly positive noise levels ζi as we demonstrate below.
The news reader has some underlying decision to make at a future date (e.g., whether or
not to vote for the politician), and optimally allocates attention given ζ1 and ζ2, which are
fixed across time. Denote his optimal allocation at time t by (β1(t), β2(t)). Each news source
i’s payoff is the discounted average attention paid to that source
∫∞
0
re−rtβi(t) dt, where r
is a (common) discount rate. We can interpret this as reduced form for advertising revenue,
where each news source receives profit proportional to the amount of viewership.22
For any fixed ζ1, ζ2, we can transform the reader’s information acquisition problem to
our model presented in Section 2 by normalizing the signals to have unit noise variances and
scaling the states θ1, θ2 accordingly (as we did in Section 5.2). For this transformed problem,
Theorem 1 characterizes the full time path of attention. In Stage 1, the higher marginal
value source receives all viewership; whereas in Stage 2, the reader mixes over both sources.
If source 1 is selected in Stage 1, then its payoff is
U1(ζ1, ζ2) =
∫ t∗1
0
re−rt dt+
∫ ∞
t∗1
re−rt
ζ1
ζ1 + ζ2
dt,
while source 2’s payoffs is
U2(ζ1, ζ2) =
∫ ∞
t∗1
re−rt
ζ2
ζ1 + ζ2
dt,
where t∗1 is the switch-point as described in Theorem 1.
Firms face a tradeoff between optimizing for greater long-run viewership—where larger
noise ζi increases the long-run proportion
ζi
ζi+ζj
—versus competing to be chosen in the short-
run—which encourages smaller ζi. Intuitively, more precise information improves the com-
petitive value of the source at the beginning of time, but reduces the value of continual
engagement with the source. How to evaluate this trade-off is not straightforward, as the
21Formally, each source provides a diffusion process with increments dXti = βi(t) · θi · dt+ ζi
√
βi(t) · dBti .
22Here, for the sake of illustrating the equilibrium, we are considering the case where the reader samples
forever. In the politician example, this would be reasonable if the election is far away.
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importance of being chosen first depends on t∗1 (the length of Stage 1), which is itself en-
dogenous to the chosen noise levels ζ1 and ζ2.
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium:
Proposition 1. Under Assumption 5, the unique equilibrium between two competing news
sources is a pure strategy equilibrium (ζ∗1 , ζ
∗
2) with
ζ∗1 = σ1(σ1 + ρσ2)z and ζ
∗
2 = σ2(σ2 + ρσ1)z,
where
z =
√
σ1σ2(1− ρ2)
r(σ1 + ρσ2)(σ2 + ρσ1)(σ21 + 2ρσ1σ2 + σ
2
2)
.
Given these equilibrium choices of noise levels, the reader optimally mixes over the sources
in the constant proportion
(
ζ∗1
ζ∗1+ζ
∗
2
,
ζ∗2
ζ∗1+ζ
∗
2
)
at every moment.
These expressions simplify substantially if we suppose that the prior covariance matrix
is symmetric (i.e., the reader is initially equally uncertain about θ1 and θ2):
Corollary 4. If σ1 = σ2 = σ, then the unique equilibrium is (ζ
∗, ζ∗) where ζ∗ = σ ·
√
1−ρ
2r
.
Our first observation is that in equilibrium, there is no “Stage 1” of information gathering:
the reader immediately begins mixing in a constant proportion over the sources. This is
despite the possibility of initial asymmetry in how well each attribute is understood. Thus,
Proposition 1 reveals that in equilibrium, sources choose noise levels that exactly offset this
prior asymmetry, equalizing their marginal values from the beginning.
Asymmetry in σi does, however, impact how the reader mixes over the sources and the
profits that the sources receive, as we discuss in the subsequent corollary.23
Corollary 5 (Division of Attention). Equilibrium attention paid to source 1,
ζ∗1
ζ∗1+ζ
∗
2
,
(a) exceeds equilibrium attention paid to source 2 if and only if σ1 ≥ σ2;
(b) is increasing in σ1 and decreasing in σ2;
(c) is decreasing in ρ if σ1 ≥ σ2 and increasing in ρ if σ1 ≤ σ2;
(d) is independent of r.
23For this set of comparative statics, we assume that changes in σ1, σ2 and ρ maintain Assumption 5, so
that Proposition 1 continues to hold.
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Part (a) says that the source providing information about the less-understood attribute
receives more attention at every moment in time (and thus also receives higher profit).
Intuitively, greater initial uncertainty increases the marginal value of learning from the cor-
responding source, giving this source a competitive advantage. But the result is more subtle
than it seems, since this asymmetry is in the prior belief only. From Corollary 1, we know
that if the sources were to provide equally informative signals (ζ1 = ζ2), then the reader
would eventually mix equally between these sources regardless of the prior. What Part (a)
says, then, is that the initial advantage conferred to a source is turned into a persistent
advantage in this strategic setting: this source can afford to provide noisier information, and
can thus capture more attention at every moment. The greater this initial asymmetry, the
larger the persistent advantage, as described in Part (b) of the corollary.
Part (c) says that attention paid to the more frequented source is decreasing in the
correlation ρ. Thus, when attributes are positively correlated—as in our example, where
carelessness increases the probability of corruption and vice versa—attention is more equal
across the sources, and the strategic advantage conferred to the source with the more un-
certain attribute is lower. In contrast, when attributes are negatively correlated—so that a
higher level on one attribute implies a lower value on the other—then initial asymmetries are
exaggerated in equilibrium, and the amount of attention paid to the sources becomes more
unequal. To the best of our knowledge, this relationship between the direction of correlation,
and how competitive the informational environment is, has not been noted.
Our final result in this section is about the overall quality of information, and how
this depends on the primitives. The sampling procedure described in Proposition 1 leads to
posterior variances about ω approximately given by
(ζ∗1+ζ
∗
2 )
2
t
at large times t.24 Thus, the sum
of standard deviations ζ∗1 + ζ
∗
2 is an appropriate measure of aggregate noise in equilibrium.
Corollary 6 (Informativeness of News). Equilibrium aggregate noise level, ζ∗1 + ζ
∗
2 ,
(a) is decreasing in the discount rate r;
(b) is increasing in c if the prior covariance matrix is parametrized as c · Σ;
(c) is decreasing in the prior correlation ρ.
24To see this, recall the transformation θ˜i = θi/ζi (described in Section 5.2), which maps this game
with endogenous noise variances to our main model with unit variances. Under this transformation, the
sources provide standard normal signals about θ˜1 and θ˜2, and the payoff-relevant state ω is ζ1θ˜1+ ζ2θ˜2. The
asymptotic approximation of posterior variances then follows from Claim 1 in Liang and Mu (2020).
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Part (a) says that the less patient the information providers are (larger r), the more
precise their signals will be in equilibrium. This is because less patient information providers
compete over short-run profits (i.e., being chosen in Stage 1), and thus prefer precise signals,
while patient providers compete for long-run profits (i.e., long-run proportion), and thus
prefer imprecise signals. Part (b) says that scaling up the prior uncertainty also increases
the endogenous choices of signal noise, generalizing what we saw in Corollary 4 for the special
case of symmetric attributes.
Part (c) says that the aggregate level of noise is decreasing in prior correlation. To un-
derstand this, note that when the reader initially learns about the less-understood attribute
1, he also learns about the other attribute 2 due to correlation. Thus the marginal val-
ues of both information sources decrease. As ρ increases, the two sources become closer to
substitutes, and the marginal value of source 2 decreases faster. Hence it takes longer for
the marginal value of source 1 to equalize the marginal value of source 2, implying a longer
Stage 1. The sources thus have stronger incentives to be chosen first, and they provide more
precise information in equilibrium.
7 Discussion
Information acquisition is a classic problem within economics, but there are relatively few
dynamic models that are simultaneously rich and tractable. In this paper we present a class
of dynamic information acquisition problems whose solution can be explicitly characterized
in closed-form. We show that a complete analysis is feasible if we assume: (1) Gaussian
uncertainty, (2) a one-dimensional payoff-relevant state, and (3) correlation across the un-
knowns that is not too strong. Given these restrictions, a great deal of generality can be
accommodated in other aspects of the problem, such as the payoff function and the pattern
of complementarity/substitution across the sources. The tractability of the solution, and the
flexibility of the environment, open the door to interesting applications, a few of which we
have illustrated here.
We conclude by briefly mentioning a few other potential extensions and variations.
Discrete Time. Although our main model is in continuous time, our results have direct
analogues in a related discrete-time model. Specifically, for the model previously described
in Remark 1, we have the following result: Suppose Assumption 4 holds. Then at each period
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t ∈ Z+, the optimal mixture over signals is (π1(t), . . . , πK(t)) where πi(t) =
∫ t+1
t
βi(s) ds for
each i, with βi(s) being the optimal attention allocation for the continuous-time model as
described in Theorem 2.25
Intertemporal Decision Problems. Our main model assumes that the agent takes
only one action at an endogenously chosen time, which simplifies the exposition. But since
our analysis based on the notion of uniform optimality is independent of the details of the
payoff function, it can be easily generalized to a setting where the agent takes N actions
a1, . . . , aN at times τ1 ≤ · · · ≤ τN . Our characterization of the optimal attention strategy
extends for any (intertemporal) payoff function u(τ1, . . . , τN , a1, . . . , aN , ω) that is decreasing
in the decision times τ1, . . . , τN . Further generalization of this result is left for future work.
A Preliminaries
A.1 Posterior Variance Function
Given qi units of attention devoted to learning about each attribute i, the posterior variance
of ω can be written in two ways:
Lemma 2. It holds that
V (q1, . . . , qK) = α
′ [(Σ−1 + diag(q))−1]α = α′ [Σ− Σ(Σ + diag(1/q))−1Σ]α
where diag(1/q) is the diagonal matrix with entries 1/q1, . . . , 1/qk.
This function V extends to a rational function (quotient of polynomials) over all of RK
(i.e., even if some qi are negative).
Proof. The equality (Σ−1 + diag(q))−1 = Σ − Σ(Σ + diag(1/q))−1Σ is well-known. To see
that V is a rational function, simply note that (Σ−1 + diag(q))−1 can be written as the
adjugate matrix of Σ−1+diag(q) divided by its determinant. Thus each entry of the posterior
covariance matrix is a rational function in q.
25In a companion piece, Liang et al. (2017), we discretize not only time but also information acquisitions:
at each period t, the agent has to choose one of K standard normal signals, without the ability to mix. The
necessity of integer approximation complicates characterization of the full sequence of signal choices. We
instead provide conditions under which myopic acquisition is (eventually) optimal.
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The next lemma calculates the first and second derivatives of the posterior variance
function V :
Lemma 3. Given a cumulated attention vector q ≥ 0, define
γ := γ(q) = (Σ−1 + diag(q))−1α
which is a vector in RK . Then the first and second derivatives of V are given by
∂iV = −γ2i , ∂ijV = 2γiγj ·
[
(Σ−1 + diag(q))−1
]
ij
.
Proof. From Lemma 2 and the formula for matrix derivatives, we have
∂iV = −α′(Σ−1 + diag(q))−1∆ii(Σ−1 + diag(q))−1α = −
[
e′i(Σ
−1 + diag(q))−1α
]2
= −γ2i
where ei is the i-th coordinate vector in R
K , and ∆ii = ei · e′i is the matrix with “1” in the
(i, i)-th entry and “0” elsewhere. For the second derivative, we compute that
∂ijV = −2γi·∂γi
∂qj
= 2γi·e′i(Σ−1+diag(q))−1∆jj(Σ−1+diag(q))−1α = 2γi·
[
(Σ−1 + diag(q))−1
]
ij
·γj
as we desire to show. The last equality follows by writing ∆jj = ej · e′j, and using e′i(Σ−1 +
diag(q))−1ej = [(Σ−1 + diag(q))−1]ij as well as e
′
j(Σ
−1 + diag(q))−1α = e′jγ = γj.
Corollary 7. V is decreasing and convex in q1, . . . , qK whenever qi ≥ 0.
Proof. By Lemma 3, the partial derivatives of V are non-positive, so V is decreasing. Addi-
tionally, its Hessian matrix is
2 diag(γ) · (Σ−1 + diag(q))−1 · diag(γ),
which is positive semi-definite whenever q ≥ 0. So V is convex.
We use these properties to show that for each t, the t-optimal vector n(t) is unique:
Lemma 4. For each t ≥ 0, there is a unique t-optimal vector n(t).
Proof. Suppose for contradiction that two vectors (r1, . . . , rK) and (s1, . . . , sK) both mini-
mize the posterior variance at time t. Relabeling the sources if necessary, we can assume
ri − si is positive for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, negative for k + 1 ≤ i ≤ l and zero for l + 1 ≤ i ≤ K. Since∑
i ri =
∑
i si = t, the cutoff indices k, l satisfy 1 ≤ k < l ≤ K.
27
For λ ∈ [0, 1], consider the vector qλ = λ · r + (1 − λ) · s which lies on the line segment
between r and s. Then by assumption we have V (r) = V (s) ≤ V (qλ). Since V is convex,
equality must hold. This means V (qλ) is a constant for λ ∈ [0, 1]. But V (qλ) is a rational
function in λ, so its value remains the same constant even for λ > 1 or λ < 0. In particular,
consider the limit as λ→ +∞. Then the i-th coordinate of qλ approaches +∞ for 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
approaches −∞ for k + 1 ≤ i ≤ l and equals ri for i > l.
For each qλ, let us also consider the vector |qλ| which takes the absolute value of each
coordinate in qλ. Note that as λ→ +∞, diag(1/|qλ|) has the same limit as diag(1/qλ). Thus
by the second expression for V (see Lemma 2), limλ→∞ V (|qλ|) = limλ→∞ V (qλ) = V (r). For
large λ, the first l coordinates of |qλ| are strictly larger than the corresponding coordinates
of r, and the remaining coordinates coincide. So the fact that V is decreasing and V (|qλ|) =
V (r) implies ∂iV (r) = 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ l.
Consider the vector γ = (Σ−1+diag(r))−1α. By Lemma 3, ∂iV (r) = −γ2i for 1 ≤ i ≤ K.
Thus γ1 = · · · = γl = 0. Since γ is not the zero vector,26 there exists j > l s.t. γj 6= 0. It
follows that ∂1V (r) = 0 > ∂jV (r). But then the posterior variance V would be reduced if
we slightly decreased the first coordinate of r (which is strictly positive since r1 > s1) and
increased the j-th coordinate by the same amount. This contradicts the assumption that r
is a t-optimal vector. Hence the lemma holds.
A.2 Optimality and Uniform Optimality
The following result ensures that a strategy that minimizes the posterior variance uniformly
at all times is an optimal strategy in any decision problem.
Lemma 5. Suppose the payoff function u(τ, a, ω) satisfies Assumption 2, then a uniformly
optimal attention strategy is dynamically optimal.
Proof. Without loss of generality we may assume the prior mean of ω is zero; otherwise shift
ω by a constant and modify the utility function accordingly. Let S∗ be the uniformly optimal
attention strategy, and {F∗t } be the induced filtration. Given S∗, the optimal stopping rule
τ is a solution to
sup
τ
E
[
max
a
E[u(τ, a, ω) | F∗τ ]
]
.
26This follows because α is not the zero vector, by assumption.
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Note that the stochastic process of posterior means M∗t = E[ω | F∗t ] is a continuous martin-
gale adapted to the filtration {F∗t }, with M∗0 = 0. Moreover, since information is Gaussian,
the quadratic variation 〈M∗〉t is simply v0 − v∗t , where v∗t is the posterior variance of ω at
time t under the strategy S∗, and v0 is the prior variance. By definition of uniform optimal-
ity, for each t the random variable v∗t is deterministic and moreover smallest among possible
posterior variances at time t.
Thus, by the Dambis–Dubins–Schwartz Theorem (see Theorem 1.7 in Chapter V of
Revuz and Yor (1999)), there exists a Brownian motion (B∗ν)ν∈[0,v0) such that
B∗v0−v∗t = E[ω | F∗t ].
This allows us to change variable from the time t to the cumulative precision v0 − v∗t .
To formulate the resulting optimization problem, for each ν ∈ [0, v0) we denote by T ∗(ν)
the time t such that v∗t = v0 − ν; T ∗ is a deterministic and increasing function of ν. Then,
under the attention strategy S∗, the agent’s optimal payoff can be rewritten as
sup
τ
E
[
max
a
E[u(τ, a, ω) | F∗τ ]
]
= sup
ν
E
[
max
a
E[u(T ∗(ν), a, ω) | B∗ν ]
]
. (5)
In other words, instead of optimizing over stopping times τ adapted to {F∗t }, we can think
of the agent choosing an optimal ν = v0 − v∗t adapted to the Brownian motion B∗.
We will show this payoff is greater than the optimal payoff under any other attention
strategy S. To do this, let {Ft} be the induced filtration under S. Similar to the above,
we consider the stochastic process Mt = E[ω | Ft], adapted to {Ft}. Applying the Dambis-
Dubins-Schwartz Theorem again, there exists a Brownian motion (Bν)ν∈[0,v0) such that
Bv0−vt = E[ω | Ft].
Here vt is the posterior variance under strategy S, which is in general random but always
satisfies vt ≥ v∗t . Note also that B may not be the same process as B∗.
Observe that for any t ≥ 0 we have t = T ∗(v0 − v∗t ) ≥ T ∗(v0 − vt). Thus the agent’s
payoff under strategy S is bounded above by
sup
τ
E
[
max
a
E[u(τ, a, ω) | Fτ ]
]
≤ sup
τ
E
[
max
a
E[u(T ∗(v0 − vτ ), a, ω) | Fτ ]
]
,
where we used Assumption 2. Now we can change variable again from τ to ν = v0− vτ , and
rewrite the payoff as
sup
ν
E
[
max
a
E[u(T ∗(ν), a, ω) | Bν ]
]
(6)
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This is the same as the RHS of (5), since B and B∗ are both Brownian motions. Hence the
payoff under S does not exceed the payoff under S∗, completing the proof.
We also have a simple converse result:
Lemma 6. Fixing Σ and α. Suppose an information acquisition strategy is optimal for all
payoff functions u(τ, a, ω) that satisfy Assumption 2, then it is uniformly optimal.
Proof. Take an arbitrary time t and consider the payoff function with u(τ, a, ω) = −(a −
ω)2− c(τ), where c(τ) = 0 for τ ≤ t and c(τ) very large for τ > t. Then the agent’s optimal
stopping rule is to stop exactly at time t. Since his information acquisition strategy is optimal
for this payoff function, the induced cumulated attention vector must achieve t-optimality.
Varying t yields the result.
A.3 Sufficient Condition for Assumption 4
At the beginning of Section 4.2, we claimed that Assumption 4 is guaranteed by (4). This
is proved in the following lemma:
Lemma 7. Suppose the prior covariance matrix Σ satisfies (4). Then its inverse matrix
satisfies [Σ−1]ii ≥ (K − 1) · |[Σ−1]ij | for all i 6= j, and is thus diagonally-dominant.
Proof. By symmetry, we can focus on i = 1. Let sj = [Σ
−1]1j for 1 ≤ j ≤ K, and without
loss assume s2 has the greatest absolute value among s2, . . . , sK . It suffices to show
s1 ≥ (K − 1)|s2|.
From Σ−1 ·Σ = I we have ∑Kj=1[Σ−1]1j ·Σj2 = 0. Thus ∑Kj=1 sj ·Σ2j = 0 because Σj2 = Σ2j .
Rearranging yields
|s1 · Σ21| = |s2 · Σ22 +
∑
j>2
sj · Σ2j | ≥ |s2 · Σ22| −
∑
j>2
|sj · Σ2j | ≥ |s2 · Σ22| −
∑
i>2
|s2 · Σ22|
2K − 3 ,
where the last inequality uses |sj| ≤ |s2| and |Σ2j | ≤ 12K−3 |Σ22| for j > 2. The above
inequality simplifies to
|s1 · Σ21| ≥ K − 1
2K − 3 · |s2 · Σ22|.
And since Σ21 ≤ 12K−3 |Σ22|, we conclude that |s1| ≥ (K − 1)|s2| as desired. Note that
s1 = [Σ
−1]11 is necessarily positive, thus s1 ≥ (K − 1)|s2|.
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B Proof of Theorem 1
Define cov1, cov2 as in the statement of Theorem 1, and define xi = αi det(Σ) to ease notation.
Given a cumulated attention vector q, let Q be a shorthand for the diagonal matrix
diag(q). Then by direct computation, we have
γ : =
(
Σ−1 +Q
)−1 · α = (Σ−1 · (I + ΣQ))−1 · α
= (I + ΣQ)−1 · Σ · α = (I + ΣQ)−1 ·
(
cov1
cov2
)
=
1
det(I + ΣQ)
(
1 + q2Σ22 −q2Σ12
−q1Σ21 1 + q1Σ11
)
·
(
cov1
cov2
)
=
1
det(I + ΣQ)
(
x1q2 + cov1
x2q1 + cov2
)
.
By Lemma 3, this implies the marginal values of the two sources are given by:
∂1V (q1, q2) =
−(x1q2 + cov1)2
det2(I + ΣQ)
; ∂2V (q1, q2) =
−(x2q1 + cov2)2
det2(I + ΣQ)
. (7)
Note that Assumption 3 translates into cov1 + cov2 ≥ 0. Under this assumption, we will
characterize the t-optimal vector (n1(t), n2(t)) and show it is increasing over time. Without
loss assume cov1 ≥ cov2, then cov1 is non-negative. Let t∗1 = cov1−cov2x2 . Then when q1+q2 ≤ t∗1
we always have
x1q2 + cov1 ≥ cov1 ≥ x2q1 + cov2,
since x1q2 ≥ 0 and x2q1 ≤ x2(q1 + q2) ≤ x2t∗1 = cov1 − cov2. We also have
x1q2 + cov1 ≥ −(x2q1 + cov2),
since x1q2, x2q1 ≥ 0 and by assumption cov1+ cov2 ≥ 0. Thus, (7) implies that ∂1V (q1, q2) ≤
∂2V (q1, q2) at such attention vectors q. So for any budget of attention t ≤ t∗1, putting all
attention to source 1 minimizes the posterior variance V . That is, n(t) = (t, 0) for t ≤ t∗1.
For t > t∗1, observe that (7) implies ∂1V (0, t) < ∂2V (0, t) as well as ∂1V (t, 0) > ∂2V (t, 0).
Thus the t-optimal vector n(t) is interior (i.e., n1(t) and n2(t) are both strictly positive). The
first-order condition ∂1V = ∂2V , together with (7) and the budget constraint n1(t)+n2(t) = t,
yields the solution
n(t) =
(
x1t+ cov1 − cov2
x1 + x2
,
x2t− cov1 + cov2
x1 + x2
)
.
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Hence n(t) is indeed increasing in t. The instantaneous attention allocations β(t) are the
time-derivatives of n(t), and they are easily seen to be described by Theorem 1. In partic-
ular, the long-run attention allocation to source i is xi
x1+x2
, which simplifies to αi
α1+α2
. This
completes the proof.
C Proof of Theorem 2
Given Lemma 5, it is sufficient to show that the t-optimal vector n(t) is weakly increasing
in t, and that its time-derivative is locally constant as described in the theorem. The proof
is divided into several sections below.
C.1 Technical Property of γ
We will repeatedly use the following technical lemma regarding the marginal values of dif-
ferent sources:
Lemma 8. Suppose Σ−1 is diagonally-dominant. Given an arbitrary attention vector q,
define γ as in Lemma 3 and denote by B the set of indices i such that |γi| is maximized.
Then γi is the same positive number for every i ∈ B.
Proof. We use Q to denote diag(q). Since (Σ−1 + Q)−1α = γ, we equivalently have α =
(Σ−1 + Q)γ. Suppose for contradiction that γi ≤ 0 for some i ∈ B. Using the above vector
equality for the i-th coordinate, we have
0 < αi =
K∑
j=1
[Σ−1 +Q]ij · γj.
Rearranging, we then have
[Σ−1 +Q]ii · (−γi) <
∑
j 6=i
[Σ−1 +Q]ij · γj ≤
∑
j 6=i
|[Σ−1 +Q]ij | · |γj|,
which is impossible because −γi = |γj| for each j 6= i and [Σ−1 + Q]ii ≥
∑
j 6=i |[Σ−1 +Q]ij |.
Thus γi is positive for i ∈ B. The result that these γi are the same follows from the definition
that their absolute values are maximal.
Remark 2. We point out that the conclusion of Lemma 8 holds under alternative assumptions
on Σ. For example, it is the case if Σ−1 has non-positive off-diagonal entries. To see how
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this implies γi is positive, note that Σ
−1 + Q is a positive-definite matrix with non-positive
off-diagonal entries, which is a so-called Stieltjes matrix. As is well known, the inverse of such
a matrix has non-negative entries. So γ = (Σ−1 + Q)−1α has all coordinates non-negative,
and the maximum γi must be positive.
Since the subsequent proof of Theorem 2 uses Assumption 4 only via Lemma 8, this
discussion suggests that the theorem also holds under the alternative assumption that Σ−1
has non-positive off-diagonal entries.
C.2 The Last Stage
To prove Theorem 2, we first consider those times t when each of the K sources has been
sampled. The following lemma shows that after any such time, it is optimal to maintain a
constant attention allocation proportional to α.
Lemma 9. Suppose Σ−1 is diagonally-dominant. If at some time t, the t-optimal vector
satisfies ∂1V (n(t)) = · · · = ∂KV (n(t)), then the t-optimal vector at each time t ≥ t is given
by
n(t) = n(t) +
t
α1 + · · ·+ αK · α.
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Proof. Consider increasing n(t) by a vector proportional to α. If we can show the equalities
∂1V = · · · = ∂KV are preserved, then the resulting cumulated attention vector must be
t-optimal. This is because for the convex function V , a vector q minimizes V (q) subject to
qi ≥ 0 and
∑
i qi = t if and only if it satisfies the KKT first-order conditions.
We check the equalities ∂1V = · · · = ∂KV by computing the marginal changes of each
∂iV when the attention vector q = n(t) increases in the direction of α. Denoting diag(q) by
Q to save notation, this marginal change equals
δi :=
K∑
j=1
∂ijV · αj = 2
K∑
j=1
γiγj
[
(Σ−1 +Q)−1
]
ij
· αj
by Lemma 3. Applying Lemma 8, we have γ1 = · · · = γK . Thus the above simplifies to
δi = 2γ
2
1
K∑
j=1
[
(Σ−1 +Q)−1
]
ij
· αj = 2γ21γi = 2γ31 .
Hence ∂1V = · · · = ∂KV continues to hold, completing the proof.
27That is, ni(t) = ni(t) +
t
α1+···+αK
· αi for each i.
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C.3 Earlier Stages
In general, we need to show that even when the agent is choosing from a subset of the
sources, the t-optimal vector n(t) is still increasing over time. This is guaranteed by the
following lemma, which says that the agent optimally attends to those sources that maximize
the marginal reduction of V , until a new source becomes another maximizer. For ease of
exposition we work under the stronger assumption that Σ−1 is strictly diagonally-dominant.
Later we discuss how the lemma should be modified without this strictness.
Lemma 10. Suppose Σ−1 is strictly diagonally-dominant. Choose any time t and denote
B = argmini ∂iV (n(t)) = argmaxi |γi|.
Then there exists β ∈ ∆K−1 supported on B and t > t such that n(t) = n(t) + (t− t) · β at
times t ∈ [t, t].
The vector β depends only on Σ, α and B. The time t is the earliest time after t at which
argmini ∂iV (n(t)) is a strict superset of B. When |B| = K, it holds that t = ∞ and β is
proportional to α, as given by Lemma 9.
Proof. Without loss we assume B = {1, . . . , k} with 1 ≤ k < K. Let q = n(t) and define γ
as before. By Lemma 8, γi is the same positive number for i ≤ k. Moreover, t-optimality
implies that qj = 0 whenever j > k. Otherwise the posterior variance could be reduced by
decreasing qj and increasing q1, as source 1 has strictly higher marginal value than source j.
We now use a trick to deduce the current lemma from the previous Lemma 9. Specif-
ically, given the prior covariance matrix Σ, we can choose another basis of the attributes
θ1, . . . , θk, θˆk+1, . . . , θˆK with two properties:
1. each θˆj (j > k) is a linear combination of the original attributes θ1, θ2, . . . , θK ;
2. Cov[θi, θˆj] = 0 for all i ≤ k < j, where the covariance is computed according to the
prior belief Σ.
Denote by θ˜ the vector (θ1, . . . , θk)
′, and by θˆ the vector (θˆk+1, . . . , θˆK)′. The payoff-relevant
state ω = α′ · θ can thus be rewritten as α˜′ · θ˜ + αˆ′ · θˆ for some constant coefficient vectors
α˜ ∈ Rk and αˆ ∈ RK−k. Using property 2 above, we can solve for α˜ from Σ, α and B:
α˜ = (ΣTL)
−1 · (ΣTL, ΣTR) · α (8)
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where ΣTL is the k × k top-left submatrix of Σ and ΣTR is the k × (K − k) top-right block.
With this transformation, we have reduced the original problem with K sources to a
smaller problem with only the first k sources. To see why this reduction is valid, recall
that sampling sources 1 ∼ k only provides information about θ˜, which is orthogonal to θˆ
according to the prior. So as long as the agent has only looked at the first k sources, the
transformed attributes continue to satisfy property 2 above (zero covariances) under any
posterior belief. It follows that the posterior variance of ω is simply the variance of α˜′ · θ˜ plus
the variance of αˆ′ · θˆ. Since the latter uncertainty cannot be reduced, the agent’s objective
(at those times when only the first k sources are attended to) is equivalent to minimizing
the posterior variance of α˜′ · θ˜.
Thus, in this smaller problem, the prior covariance matrix is ΣTL and the payoff weights
are α˜. Assuming that α˜ has strictly positive coordinates, we can then apply Lemma 9: as
long as the agent attends to the first k sources proportional to α˜, ∂1V = · · · = ∂kV continues
to hold.28 Moreover, at q = n(t), the definition of the set B implies that these k partial
derivatives are smaller (more negative) than the rest. By continuity, the same comparison
holds until some time t > t. Thus, when t ∈ [t, t], the cumulated attention vector (under this
strategy) still satisfies the first-order condition B = argmin1≤i≤K ∂iV and qj = 0 for j /∈ B.
Since V is convex, this must be the t-optimal vector as desired.
It remains to prove that α˜i is positive for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. To this end, define Q˜ =
diag(q1, . . . , qk) to be the k × k top-left submatrix of Q, and
γ˜ = ((ΣTL)
−1 + Q˜)−1 · α˜. (9)
We will show that γ˜ is just the first k coordinates of γ. Indeed, observe that ((ΣTL)
−1+Q˜)−1
is also the k × k top-left submatrix of (Σ−1 +Q)−1.29 Using (8) and (9), we have
γ˜ = [(Σ−1 +Q)−1]TL · (ΣTL)−1 · (ΣTL, ΣTR) · α
= [(Σ−1 +Q)−1]TL · (α1, . . . , αk)′ + [(Σ−1 +Q)−1]TL · (ΣTL)−1 · ΣTR · (αk+1, . . . , αK)′.
28Lemma 9 implies ∂1V˜ = · · · = ∂kV˜ , where V˜ (q1, . . . , qk) is the posterior variance of α˜′θ˜ in the smaller
problem. But as discussed, V˜ differs from V by a constant, so its derivatives are the same as those of V .
29This holds because (Σ−1 + Q)−1 = Q−1 − Q−1(Q−1 + Σ)−1Q−1. Note that Q−1 is a block matrix:
its k × k top-left block is Q˜−1, and its k × (K − k) top-right block is zeros (its bottom-right block can be
seen as the diagonal matrix with infinities). So the top-left block of Q−1 − Q−1(Q−1 + Σ)Q−1 is simply
Q˜−1−Q˜−1[(Q−1+Σ)−1]TLQ˜−1, which in turn is equal to Q˜−1−Q˜−1(Q˜−1+ΣTL)−1Q˜−1 = ((ΣTL)−1+Q˜)−1.
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On the other hand, from γ = (Σ−1 +Q)−1 · α we have
(γ1, . . . , γk)
′ =
(
[(Σ−1 +Q)−1]TL, [(Σ
−1 +Q)−1]TR
) · α
= [(Σ−1 +Q)−1]TL · (α1, . . . , αk)′ + [(Σ−1 +Q)−1]TR · (αk+1, . . . , αK)′.
Comparing the above two formulas, γ˜ is the first k coordinates of γ so long as
[(Σ−1 +Q)−1]TL · (ΣTL)−1 · ΣTR = [(Σ−1 +Q)−1]TR,
which indeed holds.30
Hence γ˜i = γi for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and it is the same positive number by Lemma 8. Rewriting
(9) as α˜ = ((ΣTL)
−1+ Q˜) · γ˜, we see that α˜i is proportional to the i-th row sum of the matrix
(ΣTL)
−1+Q˜, which is just the row sum of (ΣTL)−1 plus qi. By Carlson and Markham (1979),
if Σ−1 is (strictly) diagonally-dominant, then so is (ΣTL)−1 for any principal submatrix ΣTL.
So the row sums of (ΣTL)
−1 are all strictly positive, implying α˜i > 0.
C.4 Completing the Proof
We now apply Lemma 10 repeatedly to prove Theorem 2. Continuing to assume strict
diagonal dominance, we can apply Lemma 10 with t = 0 and deduce that up to some
time t1 = t > 0, t-optimality can be achieved by a constant attention strategy supported
on B1 = argmin1≤i≤K ∂iV (0). Applying Lemma 10 again with t = t1, we know that the
agent can maintain t-optimality from time t1 to some time t2 with a constant attention
strategy supported on B2 = argmin1≤i≤K ∂iV (n(t
1)). So on and so forth. Since the sets
∅ = B0, B1, B2, . . . are nested by construction, we eventually have Bm = {1, . . . , K} for
some m, and consequently tm =∞.
Note that Bl+1 − Bl need not be a singleton for each l (i.e., two sources can simultane-
ously become new minimizers of ∂iV ). Thus m can be smaller than K, and the nested sets
30Consider the identity (Σ−1 +Q)−1 · (Σ−1 +Q) = IK . The top-right block of the product is zeros, so by
block matrix multiplication we have
[(Σ−1 +Q)−1]TL · (Σ−1 +Q)TR = −[(Σ−1 +Q)−1]TR · (Σ−1 +Q)BR.
Next consider the identity Σ · (Σ−1 +Q) = IK +Σ(Q). The top-right block is again zeros, and we deduce
ΣTL · (Σ−1 +Q)TR = −ΣTR · (Σ−1 +Q)BR.
These two equalities together yield the desired result.
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B1, . . . , Bm and increasing times t1, . . . , tm do not necessarily satisfy the conclusion of The-
orem 2. However, this is easy to resolve by including “redundant” times. Formally, we set
tk = t
l for any k satisfying |Bl| ≤ k < |Bl+1|. We also choose B1, . . . , BK such that Bk+1−Bk
is a singleton for each k, and Bk = B
l whenever k = |Bl|. The nested sets B1, . . . , BK and
weakly increasing times t1, . . . , tK then satisfy the conclusions of Theorem 2. This completes
the characterization under the assumption that Σ−1 is strictly diagonally-dominant.
C.5 Weak Diagonal Dominance and Zero Weights
Here we demonstrate how to prove Theorem 1 assuming only that Σ−1 is weakly diagonally-
dominant. The difficulty that arises with this change is that in the proof of Lemma 10, we
cannot conclude that the optimal attention allocation has strictly positive coordinates on
B. Thus the agent does not necessarily mix over all of the sources that maximize marginal
reduction of variance.
This might lead to the failure of Theorem 2 for two reasons. First, it is possible that the
agent optimally divides attention across a subset of the sources that he has paid attention to
in the past, which would violate the requirement of nested observation sets. Second, when a
new source achieves maximal marginal value, the agent might (not attend to it and) use a
different mixture over the sources previously sampled, which would violate the requirement
of constant attention allocation for a given observation set.
We now show that neither occurs in our setting. In response to the first concern above,
note that we can still follow the proof of Lemma 10 to deduce that the optimal instantaneous
attention α˜i given to a source i ∈ argminj ∂jV (t) is proportional to the i-th row sum of
(ΣTL)
−1 plus qi. Since (ΣTL)−1 is weakly diagonally-dominant, its row sums are weakly
positive. Thus α˜i > 0 whenever qi > 0. In words, any source that has received attention in
the past will be allocated strictly positive attention at every future instant.
To address the second concern, consider two times t˜ < tˆ with
argmin
j
∂jV (n(t˜)) ( argmin
j
∂jV (n(tˆ)).
Reordering the attributes, we assume without loss that at time t˜ the first k˜ sources have the
highest marginal value, whereas at time tˆ this set expands to the first kˆ > k˜ sources. Let
α˜ ∈ Rk˜ and αˆ ∈ Rkˆ be the optimal attentions associated with these subsets, as given by (8).
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We want to show that if αˆ is supported on the same set of sources as α˜—i.e., more sources
maximize the marginal value, but the observation set is unchanged—then αˆ in fact coincides
with α˜ on their support. Indeed, by definition of αˆ (going back to the proof of Lemma 10)
we can write
ω =
kˆ∑
i=1
αˆiθi + residual term orthogonal to θ1, . . . , θkˆ.
If αˆ has the same support as α˜, then the above implies
ω =
k˜∑
i=1
αˆiθi + residual term orthogonal to θ1, . . . , θk˜,
where we use the fact that any term orthogonal to the first kˆ attributes is clearly orthogonal
to the first k˜ attributes. This last representation of ω reduces to the definition of α˜. Hence
αˆi = α˜i for 1 ≤ i ≤ k˜, as we desire to prove.
We mention that our proof of Theorem 2 (and Theorem 1) extends without change to
cases where some payoff weights are zero, rather than strictly positive. In fact, because any
source with zero weight receives no attention in the long run, it never receives any attention
under the optimal strategy in environments where our characterization applies. Thus these
sources can be simply dropped from the model without affecting our results.
D Supplementary Material to Sections 5 and 6
D.1 Generalization of Sections 5.1 and 5.2
Suppose the agent’s prior belief is as given in Section 5.1 and the observed diffusion processes
Xi evolve as dX
t
i = βi(t)θi dt+ ζi
√
βi(t) dBti , thus generalizing Sections 5.1 and 5.2.
Using the same transformation as in Section 5.2, we have that the payoff-relevant state
is ζ1θ˜1 + ζ2θ˜2, and the agent’s prior covariance matrix over (θ˜1, θ˜2) is
Σ˜ =

 σ21ζ21 ρσ1σ2ζ1ζ2
ρσ1σ2
ζ1ζ2
σ22
ζ22

 .
Assumption 3 for this transformed problem requires
σ1(σ1 + ρσ2)
ζ1
+
σ2(σ2 + ρσ1)
ζ2
≥ 0,
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which is guaranteed if σ1 = σ2 or ρ ≥ 0 or ζ1 = ζ2.
If the above inequality holds, then the characterization in Theorem 1 applies to this
problem, and we obtain:
Corollary 8. Suppose
σ1(σ1 + ρσ2)
ζ1
≥
∣∣∣∣σ2(σ2 + ρσ1)ζ2
∣∣∣∣ .
The agent’s optimal information acquisition strategy (β1(t), β2(t)) in the binary choice prob-
lem consists of two stages:
• Stage 1: At all times
t ≤ t∗1 =
σ1(σ1 + ρσ2)ζ1ζ2 − σ2(σ2 + ρσ1)ζ21
σ21σ
2
2(1− ρ2)
,
the agent optimally allocates all attention to source 1.
• Stage 2: At times t > t∗1, the agent optimally allocates his attention in the constant
proportion
(
ζ1
ζ1+ζ2
, ζ2
ζ1+ζ2
)
.
We calculate t∗1 according to the definition in Theorem 1, as follows:
t∗1 =
ζ1Σ˜11 + ζ2Σ˜12 − ζ1Σ˜21 − ζ2Σ˜22
ζ2 · det(Σ˜)
=
(
σ1(σ1 + ρσ2)
ζ1
− σ2(σ2 + ρσ1)
ζ2
)/(
ζ2 · σ
2
1σ
2
2(1− ρ2)
ζ21ζ
2
2
)
=
σ1(σ1 + ρσ2)ζ1ζ2 − σ2(σ2 + ρσ1)ζ21
σ21σ
2
2(1− ρ2)
.
D.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Once ζ1, ζ2 are chosen, we can follow the analysis in Appendix D.1 to transform the problem
into our main model. Given the assumption that σ1 + ρσ2 and σ2 + ρσ1 are both positive,
Assumption 3 is satisfied. Thus the reader’s optimal attention allocation is characterized by
Corollary 8. In particular, if t∗1 ≥ 0 ≥ t∗2, then in equilibrium source 1 is chosen exclusively
until time t∗1, after which the reader mixes in the proportion (
ζ1
ζ1+ζ2
, ζ2
ζ1+ζ2
). Source 1’s payoff
is
U1(ζ1, ζ2) =
∫ t∗1
0
re−rt dt+
∫ ∞
t∗1
re−rt
ζ1
ζ1 + ζ2
dt = 1− e−rt∗1 · ζ2
ζ1 + ζ2
,
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while source 2’s payoff is
U2(ζ1, ζ2) =
∫ ∞
t∗1
re−rt
ζ2
ζ1 + ζ2
dt = e−rt
∗
1 · ζ2
ζ1 + ζ2
.
To derive a candidate equilibrium, we set ∂U1(ζ1,ζ2)
∂ζ1
and ∂U2(ζ1,ζ2)
∂ζ2
to zero and solve for
ζ1, ζ2. Specifically, from Corollary 8 we have
t∗1 =
σ1(σ1 + ρσ2)ζ1ζ2 − σ2(σ2 + ρσ1)ζ21
σ21σ
2
2(1− ρ2)
.
It follows that
∂t∗1
∂ζ1
=
σ1(σ1 + ρσ2)ζ2 − 2σ2(σ2 + ρσ1)ζ1
σ21σ
2
2(1− ρ2)
; (10)
∂t∗1
∂ζ2
=
σ1(σ1 + ρσ2)ζ1
σ21σ
2
2(1− ρ2)
. (11)
We then have
∂U1(ζ1, ζ2)
∂ζ1
= re−rt
∗
1 · ∂t
∗
1
∂ζ1
· ζ2
ζ1 + ζ2
− e−rt∗1 · −ζ2
(ζ1 + ζ2)2
= e−rt
∗
1 · ζ2
(ζ1 + ζ2)2
·
(
r · ∂t
∗
1
∂ζ1
· (ζ1 + ζ2) + 1
)
.
(12)
So U1(ζ1,ζ2)
∂ζ1
= 0 if and only if
r · ∂t
∗
1
∂ζ1
· (ζ1 + ζ2) = −1.
Substituting in the expression for
∂t∗1
∂ζ1
from (10), this implies
− r · [σ1(σ1 + ρσ2)ζ2 − 2σ2(σ2 + ρσ1)ζ1] · (ζ1 + ζ2) = σ21σ22(1− ρ2). (13)
Similarly we have
∂U2(ζ1, ζ2)
∂ζ2
= −re−rt∗1 · ∂t
∗
1
∂ζ2
· ζ2
ζ1 + ζ2
+ e−rt
∗
1 · ζ1
(ζ1 + ζ2)2
= e−rt
∗
1 · 1
(ζ1 + ζ2)2
(
−r · ∂t
∗
1
∂ζ2
· ζ2(ζ1 + ζ2) + ζ1
)
.
(14)
So ∂U2(ζ1,ζ2)
∂ζ2
= 0 if and only if r · ∂t∗1
∂ζ2
· ζ2(ζ1 + ζ2) = ζ1. Substituting in (11), this implies
r · σ1(σ1 + ρσ2) · ζ2(ζ1 + ζ2) = σ21σ22(1− ρ2). (15)
Comparing this with (13), we see that the RHS are equal, so the LHS should also be equal.
Simplifying, we obtain
σ1(σ1 + ρσ2)ζ2 = σ2(σ2 + ρσ1)ζ1.
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Hence t∗1 = 0 in the candidate equilibrium. Additionally, the equilibrium noise levels ζ
∗
1 and
ζ∗2 are related via
ζ∗1 = σ1(σ1 + ρσ2)z ζ
∗
2 = σ2(σ2 + ρσ1)z
for some z ≥ 0. Plugging these expressions into (15) we have that
z =
√
σ1σ2(1− ρ2)
r(σ1 + ρσ2)(σ2 + ρσ1)(σ
2
1 + 2ρσ1σ2 + σ
2
2)
.
Next, we will show that (ζ∗1 , ζ
∗
2) constitute an equilibrium. Since the formulae are sym-
metric, we only check that source 1 does not have an incentive to deviate to some ζ1 6= ζ∗1 .
First consider a deviation to more precise information, ζ1 < ζ
∗
1 , in which case source 1 re-
mains the source listened to in Stage 1. The change in profit
∂U1(ζ1,ζ∗2 )
∂ζ1
is still given by (12),
and it can be shown that this is positive at all ζ1 < ζ
∗
1 , implying the desired result.
If instead the deviation is to some bigger ζ1, then the consequence is that source 2 is now
listened to in Stage 1. In this case source 1’s payoff is not given by the above calculations.
Rather, it is U˜1(ζ1, ζ2) = e
−rt∗2 · ζ1
ζ1+ζ2
. We can show that
∂U˜1(ζ1,ζ∗2 )
∂ζ1
has the same sign as
−r · ∂t∗2
∂ζ1
· ζ1(ζ1 + ζ∗2 ) + ζ∗2 ; this is similar to (14), except with subscripts flipped. Further
plugging in the expression for t∗2, we obtain that
∂U˜1(ζ1,ζ∗2 )
∂ζ1
has the same sign as
−r · σ2(σ2 + ρσ1) · ζ1(ζ1 + ζ∗2) + σ21σ22(1− ρ2).
By construction the above expression equals 0 when ζ1 = ζ
∗
1 . As ζ1 increases, this expression
becomes negative and so
∂U˜1(ζ1,ζ∗2 )
∂ζ1
< 0. Therefore source 1 also has no incentive to deviate
to higher noise.
This argument shows that ζ∗i is the unique best response of source to ζ
∗
j . Since the game
has constant sum of 1 (as total attention is 1 at every moment), we conclude that (ζ∗1 , ζ
∗
2 ) is
the unique equilibrium, pure or mixed.
D.3 Proof of Corollary 5
From Proposition 1, we have
ζ∗1
ζ∗2
= σ1(σ1+ρσ2)
σ2(σ2+ρσ1)
, which is independent of r. This proves Part
(d). Subtracting 1 from both sides, we have
ζ∗1
ζ∗2
− 1 = σ
2
1 − σ22
σ2(σ2 + ρσ1)
.
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The RHS is positive precisely when σ1 ≥ σ2. Thus we deduce that ζ∗1 ≥ ζ∗2 if and only if
σ1 ≥ σ2, as claimed in Part (a).
Moreover, if σ1 ≥ σ2, then as ρ increases the denominator σ2(σ2 + ρσ1) increases, which
implies that the proportion
σ21−σ22
σ2(σ2+ρσ1)
(on the RHS of the above display) decreases. Thus
ζ∗1
ζ∗2
decreases, and so does
ζ∗1
ζ∗1+ζ
∗
2
. Conversely, if σ1 ≤ σ2, then an increase in ρ leads to an
increase in source 1’s equilibrium attention
ζ∗1
ζ∗1+ζ
∗
2
. This proves Part (c).
Lastly we prove Part (b). It suffices to show that
ζ∗1
ζ∗2
= σ1(σ1+ρσ2)
σ2(σ2+ρσ1)
is increasing in σ1. Once
we do this, then by symmetry
ζ∗2
ζ∗1
is increasing in σ2, so that
ζ∗1
ζ∗2
is decreasing in σ2. We have
∂
(
σ1(σ1+ρσ2)
σ2(σ2+ρσ1)
)
∂σ1
=
ρσ21 + 2σ1σ2 + ρσ
2
2
σ2(σ2 + ρσ1)2
The numerator is positive because it can be written as the sum of σ1(σ2 + ρσ1) and σ2(σ1 +
ρσ2), both of which are positive by assumption. This proves Part (b).
D.4 Proof of Corollary 6
From Proposition 1, we compute that
ζ∗1 + ζ
∗
2 =
√
σ1σ2(σ
2
1 + 2ρσ1σ2 + σ
2
2)(1− ρ2)
r(σ1 + ρσ2)(σ2 + ρσ1)
,
which immediately implies Part (a). Part (b) also follows from this, since ζ∗1 + ζ
∗
2 increases
when σ1 and σ2 increase by the same factor.
To prove Part (c), we need to show that
(σ21 + 2ρσ1σ2 + σ
2
2)(1− ρ2)
(σ1 + ρσ2)(σ2 + ρσ1)
is decreasing in ρ. The derivative with respect to ρ is proportional to
−(1 − ρ2)(σ21 + 2ρσ1σ2 + σ22)2 + 2(1− ρ2)σ1σ2(σ1 + ρσ2)(σ2 + ρσ1)
− 2ρ(σ21 + 2ρσ1σ2 + σ22)(σ1 + ρσ2)(σ2 + ρσ1).
Thus we need to show
− ((1 + ρ2)σ21 + 2ρσ1σ2) · (σ1 + ρσ2)2 − ((1 + ρ2)σ22 + 2ρσ1σ2) · (σ2 + ρσ1)2 ≤ 0.
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where the LHS is a simplification of the preceding display. We note that 1+ ρ2 ≥ 2|ρ|. Thus
it suffices to show
− (2|ρ|σ21 + 2ρσ1σ2) · (σ1 + ρσ2)2 − (2|ρ|σ22 + 2ρσ1σ2) · (σ2 + ρσ1)2 ≤ 0
If ρ ≥ 0, then both terms on the LHS are positive and we are done. Suppose ρ < 0, then
after taking out the common factor 2|ρ| it remains to show
(σ21 − σ1σ2) · (σ1 + ρσ2)2 + (σ22 − σ1σ2) · (σ2 + ρσ1)2 ≥ 0.
With a little algebra, this inequality is equivalent to
(σ1 − σ2)2 ·
(
σ21 + σ
2
2 + (1 + 2ρ− ρ2)σ1σ2
) ≥ 0,
which indeed holds because σ21 + σ
2
2 + (1 + 2ρ− ρ2)σ1σ2 ≥ σ21 + σ22 − 2σ1σ2 ≥ 0.
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O For Online Publication
O.1 Uniqueness of Optimal Information Acquisition
By Lemma 5, whenever a uniformly optimal strategy exists, it is the optimal information
strategy regardless of the form of u(τ, a, ω). Without further assumptions on u, there could
exist other optimal information acquisition strategies. For example, consider the payoff
function used in the proof of Lemma 6. Under this payoff function, the agent always stops
at some fixed time τ . Hence any strategy that achieves the τ -optimal vector n(τ) gives the
same, maximal amount of information about ω at the stopping time. All such strategies are
optimal for this problem, and we cannot identify the attention allocation at any particular
instant before τ . Uniform optimality, in particular t-optimality for t < τ , is not necessary
for optimal information acquisition here.
Nonetheless, such counterexamples are non-generic. A careful inspection of the proof of
Lemma 5 suggests that if maxa E[u(τ, a, ω)] is strictly decreasing in τ given any belief about
ω, an attention allocation strategy S does as well as the uniformly optimal strategy S∗ only
if the following holds:
With probability one, when the agent stops under S the posterior variance vτ is equal to
the minimal posterior variance v∗τ .
We now introduce an assumption on the agent’s stopping rule:
Assumption 6. Given any attention allocation strategy S, any history of signal realizations
up to time t such that the agent has not stopped, and any t′ > t, there exists a positive
probability of continuation histories such that the agent optimally stops in the interval (t, t′].
We have the following result:
Proposition 2. Suppose Assumption 2 holds strictly, and Assumption 6 is satisfied. Then,
any optimal information acquisition strategy coincides with the uniformly optimal strategy at
every history where the agent has not stopped.
Proof. Suppose that after some history at time t, the strategy S deviates from uniform
optimality. Then, along this history, the posterior variances under S in the interval (t, t′] are
strictly larger than under S∗ (for some t′ slightly bigger than t). By assumption, the agent
1
stops in this interval with positive probability. Thus there is positive probability that the
agent stops with posterior variance vτ > v
∗
τ . As discussed, this implies that the payoff under
S is strictly below S∗.
We note that although Assumption 6 is stated in terms of the endogenous stopping rule,
it is satisfied in any problem where the agent always stops to take some action when he has
an extremely high (or low) expectation about ω. This is in turn guaranteed if extreme values
of ω agree on the optimal action, and if the marginal cost of waiting is bounded away from
zero. These conditions on the primitives are rather weak, and are satisfied in most natural
applications of the model (e.g., binary choice with constant marginal waiting cost).
O.2 Non-existence of Uniformly Optimal Strategy
O.3 Counterexample for K = 2
The example below illustrates how and why Theorem 1 might fail without Assumption 3:
Example 4. There are two unknown attributes with prior distribution(
θ1
θ2
)
∼ N
((
µ1
µ2
)
,
(
10 −3
−3 1
))
.
The agent wants to learn θ1 + 4θ2.
Given q1 units of attention devoted to learning θ1, and q2 devoted to θ2, the agent’s
posterior variance about ω is given by (3). Simplifying, we have
V (q1, q2) =
2 + 16q1 + q2
(1 + q1)(10 + q2)− 9 .
The t-optimal cumulated attention vectors n(t) (see Section 4.3) are defined to minimize
V (q1, q2) subject to q1, q2 ≥ 0 and the budget constraint q1 + q2 ≤ t.
These vectors do not evolve monotonically: Initially, the marginal value of learning θ1
exceeds that of learning θ2, since the agent has greater prior uncertainty about θ1 (even
accounting for the difference in payoff weights). Thus at all times t ≤ 1/4, the t-optimal
vector is (t, 0), and the agent learns only about attribute 1.
After a quarter-unit of time devoted to learning θ1, the agent’s posterior covariance
matrix becomes
(
20/7 −6/7
−6/7 5/14
)
. Note that the two sources have equal marginal values at
2
t = 1/4, since ω = θ1+4θ2 is independent of θ1+ θ2.
31 However, to maintain equal marginal
values at future instants, it is actually optimal to take attention away from attribute 1 and
re-distribute it to attribute 2. Specifically, at all times t ∈ (1/4, 1] the t-optimal vector is
given by n(t) =
(−t+1
3
, 4t−1
3
)
, and the optimal cumulated attention toward attribute 1 is
decreasing in this interval.32
This failure of monotonicity occurs because at t = 1/4, the two sources of information
strongly substitute one another—by Lemma 3 in Appendix A.1, the cross-partial ∂12V =
96/343 > 0, suggesting that the marginal value of either source (as measured by reduction in
the posterior variance V ) is lower after having learned from the other source. Consequently,
there does not exist a uniformly optimal strategy in this example (Lemma 1). Hence the
optimal information acquisition strategy varies according to when the agent expects to stop,
and Theorem 1 cannot hold independently of the payoff criterion (Lemma 6).
O.4 Necessity of Assumption 3 for Theorem 1
We show here that when K = 2, the assumption cov1 + cov2 ≥ 0 is also necessary for the
existence of a uniformly optimal strategy. The result generalizes Example 4 above.
Proposition 3. Suppose K = 2 and Assumption 3 is violated. Then a uniformly optimal
strategy does not exist.
Proof. Suppose that cov1 + cov2 < 0. First note that one of cov1, cov2 is positive, because
α1cov1 + α2cov2 = α
′Σα > 0. So without loss we can assume cov2 > 0 > −cov2 > cov1.
Moreover, from α1cov1 + α2cov2 > 0 we obtain α2 > α1 and hence x2 > x1. Below we
characterize the t-optimal attention vector n(t):
1. If t ≤ −(cov1+cov2)
x2
, then x1q2 + cov1 is negative and has larger absolute value than
x2q1 + cov2 (which is positive) whenever q1 + q2 = t. By (7), this means ∂1V (q1, q2) ≤
31Lemma 3 shows that the marginal value of learning θi is given by γ
2
i , where γi is the posterior covariance
between ω and θi. Thus the marginal values are equal if and only if Cov(ω, θ1) = ±Cov(ω, θ2); that is, ω is
independent of either θ1 − θ2 or θ1 + θ2. The key difference between this counterexample and Example 3 is
that here ω is independent of the sum θ1+ θ2, rather than the difference θ1− θ2. Although both cases imply
equal marginal values, it turns out that independence between ω and θ1 − θ2 is necessary for maintaining
equal marginal values at future instants.
32Subsequently, at times t ∈ (1, 3], the t-optimal vector is n(t) = (0, t), allocating all attention to attribute
2. Finally, at times t ≥ 3, n(t) = ( t−3
5
, 4t+3
5
)
, allocating attention proportional to α.
3
∂2V (q1, q2), and so n(t) = (t, 0). In words, with a very small budget, it is optimal to
devote all attention to source 1.
2. If −(cov1+cov2)
x2
< t < −(cov1+cov2)
x1
, then ∂1V (0, t) < ∂2V (0, t) and ∂1V (t, 0) > ∂2V (t, 0).
These imply that n(t) is interior, and the first-order condition yields
x1n2(t) + cov1 = −(x2n1(t) + cov2),
where we use the fact that for t in this range, x1q2 + cov1 is always negative. Together
with n1(t) + n2(t) = t, we can solve that n(t) = (
−x1t−cov1−cov2
x2−x1 ,
x2t+cov1+cov2
x2−x1 ).
3. If −(cov1+cov2)
x1
≤ t ≤ cov2−cov1
x1
, then (x2q1+cov2)
2−(x1q2+cov1)2 = (cov2−cov1−x1q2+
x2q1)·(cov1+cov2+x1q2+x2q1) ≥ 0 whenever q1+q2 = t. Thus ∂1V (q1, q2) ≥ ∂2V (q1, q2),
implying that the t-optimal attention vector should be n(t) = (0, t).
4. Finally, if t > cov2−cov1
x1
, then it holds that ∂1V (0, t) < ∂2(0, t) and ∂1V (t, 0) > ∂2(t, 0).
So n(t) is interior and satisfies the first-order condition
x1n2(t) + cov1 = x2n1(t) + cov2,
since both terms are now positive. This together with n1(t) + n2(t) = t yields the
solution n(t) = (x1t+cov1−cov2
x1+x2
, x2t−cov1+cov2
x1+x2
) and completes the analysis.
Note that in Case 2 above, as t increases in the range, n1(t) actually decreases. This proves
that a uniformly optimal strategy does not exist.
O.5 An Algorithm for Computing the Optimal Information Ac-
quisition Strategy when K > 2
Here we provide an algorithm for recursively finding the times tk and sets Bk in Theorem 2;
detailed proof is in Appendix C.
Set Q0 to be the K ×K matrix of zeros, and t0 = 0. For each stage k ≥ 1:
1. (Computation of the observation set Bk.) Define the K × 1 vector γk = (Σ−1 +
Qk−1)−1 · α where Σ is the prior covariance matrix, and α is the weight vector. The
set of attributes that the agent attends to in stage k is
Bk = argmaxi |γki |.
These sources have highest marginal reduction of posterior variance (see Lemma 3).
4
2. (Computation of the constant attention allocation in stage k.) If |Bk| > k
then stage k is degenerate, and we proceed to stage k + 1 with Qk = Qk−1. Otherwise
we can re-order the attributes so that the k attributes in Bk are the first k attributes.
In an abuse of notation, let Σ be the covariance matrix for the re-ordered attribute
vector θ. Define ΣTL to be the k × k top-left submatrix of Σ and ΣTR to be the
k × (K − k) top-right block. Finally let
αk = (ΣTL)
−1 · (ΣTL, ΣTR) · α
be a k × 1 vector. The agent’s optimal attention allocation in stage k is proportional
to αk; that is,
βki =
{
αki /
∑
i α
k
i if i ≤ k
0 otherwise
As the agent acquires information in this mixture during stage k, the marginal values
of learning about different attributes in Bk remain the same, and strictly higher than
learning about any attribute outside of the set.
3. (Computation of the next time tk.) For arbitrary t, define
Qk(t) := Qk−1 + (t− tk−1) · diag(βk).
Let tk be the smallest t > tk−1 such that the coordinates maximizing (Σ−1+Qk(t))−1 ·α
are a strict superset of Bk.
33 At this time, the marginal value of some attribute(s)
outside of Bk equalizes the attributes in Bk, and stage k + 1 commences, with Qk =
Qk(tk).
We demonstrate this in an example:
33This smallest time can be computed as follows. For each j > k, consider the following (polynomial)
equation in t: (
e′j · (Σ−1 +Qk(t))−1 · α
)2
=
(
e′1 · (Σ−1 +Qk(t))−1 · α
)2
.
Any solution t > tk−1 is a time at which source j would have the same marginal value as sources 1, . . . , k.
Such a solution t necessarily exists, since at t = tk−1 the LHS is smaller by assumption, while at t =∞ the
LHS is bigger as the RHS is 0. Let s(j) be the smallest solution to the above equation, for each fixed j > k.
Then tk := minj>k s(j) is the earliest time after tk−1 such that the sources having the greatest marginal
value are a strict superset of the first k sources.
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Example 5. Suppose there are three unknown attributes, and the agent wants to learn ω =
θ1 + θ2 + θ3. The agent’s prior over these attribute values is

θ1
θ2
θ3

 ∼ N




µ1
µ2
µ3

 ,


4 0 0
0 4 −1
0 −1 3




Note that this prior satisfies Assumption 2.
The optimal information acquisition strategy consists of three stages:
Stage 1. The agent initially puts all attention towards learning θ1. To interpret, notice
that negative correlation between attributes θ2 and θ3 reduces the overall uncertainty about
the sum θ2 + θ3; thus, the marginal value of learning θ1 is initially higher than learning
either θ2 or θ3. The agent attends only to θ1 until time t1 =
1
12
, at which point his posterior
covariance matrix becomes 

3 0 0
0 4 −1
0 −1 3

 ,
as given by (2). This posterior belief has the property that ω = θ1 + θ2 + θ3 is independent
of θ1 − θ2, so as discussed the marginal values of learning θ1 and learning θ2 have equalized
(see Footnote 31). Since the posterior variance of θ3 is smaller than θ2, the marginal value
of learning θ3 is strictly lower.
Stage 2. The agent next splits his attention between learning θ1 and learning θ2 in the
constant proportion (4/7, 3/7). These acquisitions reduce the marginal value of learning θ1
and the marginal value of learning θ2 at the same rate, thus maintaining the equality between
these marginal values. At time t2 =
13
44
, the agent’s posterior covariance matrix is


11/5 0 0
0 44/15 −11/15
0 −11/15 44/15

 .
The marginal values of learning all three attributes have become the same, since at this time
ω = θ1 + θ2 + θ3 is independent of both θ1 − θ2 and θ1 − θ3.
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Stage 3. From this time on, the agent acquires information evenly from each source via
the constant attention allocation (1/3, 1/3, 1/3).
O.6 Arbitrary Priors
Even if the prior belief does not satisfy our assumptions, we still have the following result:
Proposition 4. Starting from any prior belief, the optimal information acquisition strategy
is eventually a constant attention allocation (across all sources) proportional to the weight
vector α.
The proof of Proposition 4 is based on two lemmata:
Lemma 11. Starting from any prior belief, the optimal information acquisition strategy
has the property that the induced cumulated attentions qi(t) → ∞ for each 1 ≤ i ≤ K as
t→∞.34
Lemma 12. Suppose qi(t) → ∞ for each 1 ≤ i ≤ K. Then, the agent’s posterior beliefs
satisfy Assumption 4 at all sufficiently late times.
Lemma 12 is easy to prove: just observe that the agent’s posterior precision matrix is
Σ−1 + Q, which must be diagonally-dominant as qi(t) → ∞ for each i. Below we prove
Lemma 11.
O.7 Proof Outline for Lemma 11
We claim the following result holds:
Lemma 13. Fix Σ and α. Given any q ∈ R+, there exists q ∈ R+ such that the cumulated
attention vectors q(t) under the optimal strategy have the following property: Whenever
qi(t) < q for some source i, it holds that qj(t) ≤ q for every source i.
Taking the contrapositive, this result says that whenever a source j has received attention
more than q, then each source i has received attention at least q. Since there necessarily
34We note that starting from a general prior belief, qi(t) can be a random variable depending on past
signal realizations. Thus the lemma asserts that each source receives infinite attention along every history.
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exists such a source j as t→∞, the consequence is that all sources must eventually receive
cumulated attention ≥ q. This lemma thus implies Lemma 11.
We now sketch how we prove the above lemma. First it is clear that the result for any q
follows from the result for any larger q. So we will assume q is large (to be formalized later).
We will then prove the result by choosing q even larger (also determined later). Suppose for
contradiction that after some history, the cumulated attention vector satisfies qi(t0) < q and
qj(t0) > q. By relabeling the signals, we can assume that
q1(t0), . . . , qk(t0) < q ≤ qk+1(t0), . . . , qK−1(t0); qK(t0) > q.
That is, the cumulated attention devoted to each of the first k sources is “deficient,” whereas
source K has received “excessive” attention. We can further assume that source K continues
to receive positive attention in some interval (t0, t0 + ǫ]; otherwise we can replace t0 by an
earlier time without changing these conditions. Our proof method will be to construct a
profitable deviation strategy (of how to allocation attention) following this history, so that
optimality is violated. Thanks to the main theorem of Greenshtein (1996), any deviation
strategy is profitable so long as it decreases the posterior variance about ω at all future times.
Given a deviation strategy, let q˜(t) denote the induced cumulated attention vector, which is
distinguished from q(t). Then the deviation is profitable whenever the following inequality
holds:35
V (q˜(t)) ≤ V (q(t)), ∀t ≥ t0.
O.8 The Deviation
We now construct such a deviation. Take any time T ≥ t0, there are three cases:
(a) Suppose that the original strategy S devotes positive attention to source K at time
T . Then under the deviation strategy, the agent diverts this attention (evenly) toward
those sources i with q˜i(T ) < q.
36 If no such source exists, the deviation strategy devotes
the same amount of attention to source K.
35Such a deviation is strictly profitable if in addition V (q˜(t)) < V (q(t)) holds strictly for t ∈ (t0, t0 + ǫ],
which is verified below.
36Formally, when the time derivative of qK(T ) is positive, we set the time derivative of q˜K(T ) to be zero,
and compensate it by increasing the time derivatives of q˜i(T ) for those signals i insufficiently observed.
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(b) Suppose that the original strategy devotes attention to some source in k+1, . . . , K−1.
Then the deviation strategy devotes the same attention to this source.
(c) Suppose that the original strategy devotes attention to source i ≤ k. If q˜i(T ) < q
or q˜i(T ) = qi(t), then the deviation strategy also observes source i. Otherwise we
have q˜i(T ) = q > qi(T ), and in this case the deviation strategy diverts this amount of
attention to source K instead.
To interpret, the deviation strategy starts to deviate at time t0, when some source K has
been observed too often compared to some other sources 1, . . . , k. Following that history, the
deviation refrains from observing source K and instead devotes attention to sources 1, . . . , k,
until all of these “deficient” sources are no longer deficient, after which the deviation strategy
agrees with the original strategy in the amount of attention allocated to source i.
O.9 Four Kinds of Sources
Our end goal is to show that at any time T ≥ t0, either q˜(T ) = q(T ), or V (q˜(T )) <
V (q(T )). This will show that the deviation is profitable. But to do that, we first provide
a categorization of the different sources and their cumulated attention vectors (under the
deviation strategy versus the original strategy).
1. For sources i ∈ I1 ⊂ {1, . . . , k}, we have qi < q˜i < q (henceforth we fix T and use qi to
denote qi(T )). By construction, these sources have received equal attention diverted
from source K, under the deviation strategy. So for some x > 0 it holds that
q˜i = qi + x, ∀i ∈ I1.
2. For sources i ∈ I2 ⊂ {1, . . . , k}, we have qi < q˜i = q. These are the sources that
have reached the target level q under the deviation strategy, but not under the original
strategy. Let xi denote the difference q˜i − qi, then by construction we have xi ≤ x,
which is defined above.
3. For sources i ∈ I3, we have qi = q˜i ≥ q. These include the sources k+1, . . . , K−1, which
the deviation strategy does not affect. Also included are those sources in 1, . . . , k that
have reached cumulated attention q under both the original and deviation strategies.
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4. Finally, source K is the only source with qi > q˜i. In fact we have
qK − q˜K =
∑
i<K
(q˜i − qi) = |I1| · x+
∑
i∈I2
xi.
Suppose q˜ 6= q, then either I1 or I2 is non-empty. We will use this characterization to
show V (q˜) < V (q).
O.10 Comparison of Posterior Variances
The following technical lemma is needed, and we prove it at the end:
Lemma 14. There exists a positive constant CH depending only on Σ and α, such that for
all q1, . . . , qK ≥ 0,
∂iV (q) ≥ −CH
q2i
, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ K.
Moreover, there exists another positive constant CL such that the following holds when q is
large:
If q1, . . . , qK ≥ q, then
∂iV (q) ≤ −CL
q2i
, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ K.
And if some qi < q, then there exists j such that
qj < q and ∂jV (q) ≤ −CL
q2
.
To prove V (q˜) < V (q), first consider the case that I1 (defined in the previous subsection)
is the empty set. Let j ∈ I2 be the source that maximizes xj = q˜j − qj . We then have
V (q˜) = V (q˜j , q˜−j) ≤ V (qj , q˜−j) + (q˜j − qj) · ∂jV (q˜) (16)
≤ V (qj , q˜−j)− xj · CL
q2
(17)
≤ V (q1, . . . , qK−1, q˜K)− xj · CL
q2
. (18)
The first inequality uses the convexity of V . The second inequality uses the second part of
Lemma 14 (which applies because q˜i ≥ q for all i when I1 is empty), as well as q˜j = q (since
j ∈ I2). The last inequality uses the monotonicity of V and q˜i ≥ qi for all but the last source.
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On the other hand, we also have
V (q) ≥ V (q1, . . . , qK−1, q˜K) + (qK − q˜K) · ∂KV (q1, . . . , qK−1, q˜K) (19)
≥ V (q1, . . . , qK−1, q˜K)− (K − 1)xj · CH
(q˜K)2
, (20)
where the first inequality is by convexity, and the second uses the first part of Lemma 14
and qK − q˜K =
∑
i∈I2 xi ≤ (K − 1)xj by our choice of j.
Recall that q˜K ≥ q. Thus whenever q is much larger compared to q, the above inequalities
(16) and (19) imply that V (q˜) < V (q), as we desire to show.
Next we consider the case where I1 is non-empty. By the third part of Lemma 14, we
can choose j ∈ I1 such that ∂jV (q˜) ≤ −CLq2 . Then, similar to (16) we have
V (q˜) ≤ V (q1, . . . , qK−1, q˜K)− x · CL
q2
,
with x replacing the role of xj . Likewise, we have the following analogue of (19):
V (q) ≥ V (q1, . . . , qK−1, q˜K)− (K − 1)x · CH
(q˜K)2
,
where we used qK − q˜K = |I1| · x+
∑
i∈I2 xi ≤ (K − 1)x.
Hence we are once again able to deduce V (q˜) < V (q) so long as q˜K ≥ q is much larger
than q. This completes the proof of Proposition 4 modulo Lemma 14.
O.11 Proof of Lemma 14
In light of Lemma 3, the key will be to estimate the size of the different coordinates of
γ = (Σ−1 +Q)−1 · α.
For the first part, note that the matrix norm of the posterior covariance matrix (Σ−1 +
Q)−1 is bounded above (by the norm of the prior covariance matrix Σ). Thus for any possible
q, the vector γ is bounded. We now write
α = (Σ−1 +Q) · γ.
Comparing the i-th coordinate on both sides, we have αi = e
′
i · Σ−1 · γ + qiγi. This then
implies that the product qiγi is bounded across different possible q. Since ∂iV (q) = −γ2i , the
first part of Lemma 14 is proved.
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For the second part, we use the matrix identity
(Σ−1 +Q)−1 = Q−1 −Q−1 · (Σ +Q−1)−1 ·Q−1.
So γi = e
′
i · (Σ−1 + Q)−1 · α = αiqi − 1qi · e′i · (Σ + Q−1)−1 · Q−1 · α. If q1, . . . , qK are all large,
then the term being subtracted is at most αi
2qi
, because the matrix norm of (Σ + Q−1)−1 is
bounded above and the norm of Q−1 is small. Thus γi ≥ αi2qi , implying that ∂iV ≤
−α2i
4q2i
. The
second part of the lemma holds for CL = mini
α2i
4
.
For the third part, let q1, . . . , qm < q ≤ qm+1, . . . , qK . Suppose for the sake of contradic-
tion that ∂iV (q) >
−CL
q2
for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m, with CL defined above. Then |γi| < αi2q < αi2qi for
1 ≤ i ≤ m. Thus, αi − qiγi > αi2 . We now rewrite α = (Σ−1 +Q) · γ as
Σ · (α−Qγ) = γ.
Since the i-th coordinate of α − Qγ is simply αi − qiγi, we deduce that the vector norm of
α−Qγ is bounded away from zero. So the above identity suggests that the norm of γ is also
bounded away from zero. However, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m we have |γi| < αi2q by hypothesis, and for
i > m we know from the first part that |γi| ≤
√
CH
qi
≤
√
CH
q
. Hence the norm of γ is in fact
close to zero when q is large. This leads to a contradiction and completes the proof.
O.12 Many Competing Information Providers
Here we demonstrate how the game in Section 6 generalizes to the case of K > 2 competing
information sources. The setup is similar: the reader seeks to learn θ1 + · · · + θK where
the noise level ζi about each θi is controlled by a separate information provider. We assume
the reader’s prior over these attributes is symmetric; specifically, each attribute has prior
variance 1 and each pair of attributes has prior covariance ρ for some ρ ∈ (−1, 1).37
Using the transformation θ˜i =
θi
ζi
, we can reduce the reader’s information acquisition
problem to our main model with prior covariance matrix
Σ˜ =


1
ζ21
ρ
ζ1ζ2
. . . ρ
ζ1ζK
ρ
ζ1ζ2
1
ζ22
. . . ρ
ζ2ζK
. . . . . . . . . . . .
ρ
ζ1ζK
ρ
ζ2ζK
. . . 1
ζ2
K

 .
37By scaling the attributes, it is straightforward to generalize to the case where prior variances are σ2 and
prior covariances are ρσ2. In equilibrium, sources simply scale their noise levels by σ.
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and weight vector α˜ = (ζ1, . . . , ζK)
′.
Although Σ˜ does not in general satisfy Assumption 4, it turns out that the optimal
attention allocations can still be characterized in the same way as Theorem 2, thanks to the
symmetry in this problem. Specifically, we have:
Lemma 15. Suppose ζ1 ≤ ζ2 ≤ · · · ≤ ζK. For 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1, define
tk =
1
1− ρ
k∑
i=1
ζi(ζk+1 − ζi)
and define tK = +∞. Then for any k, the optimal attention allocation is constant at all
times t ∈ [tk−1, tk) and supported on the first k sources, where each source i ≤ k receives
attention proportional to its weight ζi.
Using this result, it is straightforward to solve for the symmetric pure strategy equilibrium
of the game. Indeed, suppose the other sources all choose ζ∗; then, source 1’s payoff when
choosing ζ1 ≤ ζ∗ is given by
1
r
(
1− (K − 1)ζ
∗
ζ1 + (K − 1)ζ∗ · e
−rζ1(ζ
∗
−ζ1)
(1−ρ)
)
.
Differentiating this w.r.t. ζ1 yields the first-order condition r·(ζ1+(K−1)ζ∗)·(2ζ1−ζ∗) ≤ 1−ρ
at ζ1 = ζ
∗, so that ζ∗ ≤
√
1−ρ
Kr
.
On the other hand, by choosing ζ1 > ζ
∗, source 1 gets
ζ1
ζ1 + (K − 1)ζ∗ · e
−r(K−1)ζ∗(ζ1−ζ
∗)
1−ρ .
Differentiating w.r.t. ζ1 yields another first-order condition r · ζ1 · (ζ1 + (K − 1)ζ∗) ≥ 1 − ρ
at ζ1 = ζ
∗. Thus ζ∗ ≥
√
1−ρ
Kr
, showing such an equilibrium is unique.
Proof of Lemma 15. Fix any stage k and any time t ∈ [tk−1, tk) with tk defined in the lemma.
Then, according to the lemma, the t-optimal attention vector n(t) satisfies
ni(t) =
ζi(ζk − ζi)
1− ρ +
ζi
ζ1 + · · ·+ ζk · (t− tk−1), ∀1 ≤ i ≤ k (21)
and ni(t) = 0 for i > k. Conversely, if we can show this vector n(t) is indeed t-optimal, then
the lemma would follow.
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Let q denote this attention vector for ease of exposition. To prove q minimizes the
posterior variance function, it is equivalent to check the first-order condition (noting that q
is supported on the first k sources):
∂1V (q) = · · · = ∂kV (q) < min
i>k
∂iV (q).
Using Lemma 3, it suffices to show
γ1 = · · · = γk ≥ γk+1 ≥ · · · ≥ γK > 0,
where as usual γ = (Σ˜+diag(q))−1·α˜. Observe that the prior covariance Σ˜ in the transformed
problem can be written as
Σ˜ = diag(ζ)−1 · Σ · diag(ζ)−1,
with Σ being the matrix having “1”s on the diagonal and “ρ” everywhere off the diagonal,
and ζ denoting the vector (ζ1, . . . , ζK)
′ (with a slight abuse of notation). From the above
discussion, ζ is also the weight vector α˜.
Thus, we can compute the key γ vector as follows:
γ = (Σ˜−1 + diag(q))−1 · α˜
= (diag(ζ) · Σ−1 · diag(ζ) + diag(q))−1 · ζ
= (Σ−1 · diag(ζ) + diag(q/ζ))−1 · diag(ζ)−1 · ζ
= (Σ−1 · diag(ζ) + diag(q/ζ))−1 · 1,
where we use diag(q/ζ) to denote the diagonal matrix with entries q1/ζ1, . . . , qK/ζK .
We let M denote the matrix Σ−1 · diag(ζ) + diag(q/ζ). Then M · γ = 1, so that
K∑
j=1
Mij · γj = 1, ∀i. (22)
We will use these identities to show that each γj is positive and γ1 = · · · = γk are the largest
coordinates of γ.
In fact, observe that Σ−1 is the matrix with diagonal entries equal to a = 1+(K−2)ρ
(1−ρ)(1+(K−1)ρ)
and off-diagonal entries equal to b = −ρ
(1−ρ)(1+(K−1)ρ) . Thus fromM = Σ
−1 ·diag(ζ)+diag(q/ζ)
we deduce
Mij = bζj + ((a− b)ζi + qi
ζi
) · δj=i,
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with δj=i representing the indicator function for the event j = i. Plugging this into (22), we
then obtain (
(a− b)ζi + qi
ζi
)
· γi = 1−
K∑
j=1
bζjγj , ∀i.
Since the RHS is independent of i, we conclude that γ1, . . . , γK have the same sign and each
γi is inversely proportional to (a− b)ζi + qiζi .
Now recall that γ = (Σ˜−1 + diag(q))−1 · α˜. So α˜′ · γ = α˜′ · (Σ˜−1 + diag(q))−1 · α˜, which is
positive since (Σ˜−1 +diag(q))−1 is a positive-definite matrix. It follows that the coordinates
of γ cannot all be less than or equal to zero. By the preceding analysis, they must all be
positive. Finally, to show γ1, . . . , γk are equal and larger than the remaining coordinates, it
suffices to consider their inverses, which are proportional to (a − b)ζi + qiζi . From (21) and
a− b = 1
1−ρ we indeed have
(a− b)ζi + qi
ζi
=
1
1− ρ · ζk +
t− tk−1
ζ1 + · · ·+ ζk , ∀1 ≤ i ≤ k.
The RHS is the same for i ≤ k and smaller than (a − b)ζk+1 when t < tk. This completes
the proof that γ1 = · · · = γk ≥ γk+1 ≥ · · · ≥ γK . Lemma 15 follows.
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